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This book came about as the result of a doctoral research on the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of the field of intercultural communication. Its main 
purpose is to interrogate three paradigms that have become common cur-
rency in intercultural communication, but that are becoming the object of 
scrutiny in recent critical approaches to the field: the role of tolerance in 
shaping the relation between self and other, the idea of intercultural aware-
ness as a narrative of reconciliation and final erasure of all differences and 
finally the notion of intercultural competence. These paradigms are inter-
rogated in a systematic review of the relevant literature, while proposing 
an alternative conceptualisation of the intercultural, based on the ethics of 
Levinas. In doing this, the book confronts the issue of future develop-
ments in the field, in particular in relation to new methodological perspec-
tives that reflect the contingent and shifting nature of intercultural 
relations. The book questions the idea of intercultural dialogue as an 
unproblematised construct, and it focuses on aligning research in this field 
with current debates on tolerance and multiculturalism, and with the issue 
of displacement and conflict at a global level. This critical analysis of the 
field of intercultural communication challenges current instrumentalist 
approaches to communication in complex and often challenging circum-
stances in an ever increasing diverse global context, characterised by con-
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Abstract This introductory chapter discusses methodological perspec-
tives in intercultural communication, and in particular the theoretical 
underpinnings of a philosophical investigation of the field. It provides a 
synopsis of the book, outlining the main themes discussed in the three 
chapters. Chapter 2, A Critical Framework for Intercultural Communication, 
engages with the theoretical presuppositions in the work of leading critical 
interculturalists. Chapter 3, The Ethics of Interculturality, discusses the 
relevance of the ethics of Levinas for intercultural communication. Chapter 
4, Dwelling or sojourning? Modalities of Interculturality, considers the 
ethical implications of Levinas’s ethics for the development of a framework 
that addresses the limitations of current conceptualisations of competence 
in intercultural communication.
Keywords Critical interculturalism • Essentialism and neo-essentialism • 
Interculturalism and inter-disciplinarity
Main TheMes
This book addresses the wider implications of intercultural communica-
tion in the background of widening gaps between self/other along axis of 
citizenship, inequality and cultural hegemony. Indeed, as events unfold in 
contemporary global politics, it is perhaps time to take stock and reflect on 
the nature of intercultural communication as an academic discipline. 
giuliana.ferri@uwl.ac.uk
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Amidst the large number of methodological and theoretical approaches 
that characterise this field, this book endeavours to present the ideas of 
contamination and interdisciplinary connections as invaluable theoretical 
resources for intercultural researchers in challenging and shifting times. 
The adoption of the ethics of Levinas has a twofold implication in this 
book: first, it offers a framework for the dialogic reconceptualisation of 
interculturalism based on the interaction between self and other, and sec-
ond it allows the recognition of the other not as an abstract entity but in 
terms of a corporeal, or embodied self, enmeshed in networks of power 
and hegemony. Both reposition intercultural communication within a new 
paradigm that challenges static interpretations of self and other adopted in 
the models of competence analysed critically in this book.
Chapter 2 illustrates current approaches to critical intercultural com-
munication and it engages with the theoretical presuppositions in the work 
of leading critical interculturalists. The interdisciplinary approach adopted 
in this appraisal of critical intercultural frameworks foregrounds the philo-
sophical concerns underpinning research in this field, exemplified in the 
work of Jensen (2003), Monceri (2003, 2009), Dervin (2011), Holliday 
(2011, 2013) and Guilherme (2002). The aim of this chapter is to discuss 
the philosophical underpinnings of these critical intercultural frameworks 
that are paradigmatic of perspectivism (Nietzsche 1968), social construc-
tivism (Bauman 2000) and emancipatory critique (Horkheimer 1982; 
Habermas 1984). This critical reading problematizes two of the constructs 
that are more commonly employed in intercultural communication: the 
role of tolerance in shaping the relation between self and other, and the 
idea of intercultural awareness as a narrative of reconciliation and final 
erasure of all differences. This chapter discusses the categories of class and 
gender to further develop the distinction established by Holliday (2011) 
between Western and non-Western cultural worlds, or Centre and 
Periphery, employed as lenses through which it is possible to analyse the 
politics of cultural hegemony, in reference to the notion of the privileged 
subject and the subaltern other (Spivak 1988, 1999, 2004). Building on 
this critical reading, the chapter argues that narratives of reconciliation of 
difference and acquisition of awareness follow a Hegelian dialectical 
model, which accounts for the tendency in intercultural research to search 
for a final moment of understanding in which all conflicts are resolved. 
The negative dialectic of Adorno is introduced as the alternative theoreti-




incompleteness and open-endedness proposed in this book. Following 
from the discussion in Chap. 2, and adopting the theoretical framework 
delineated therein, Chap. 3 provides an illustration of the ethics of Levinas 
and its relevance for intercultural communication. It discusses the notion 
of subjectivity as it is formulated by Levinas (1969, 1998), which provides 
an account of the relationship between self and other that informs an ethi-
cal conception of intercultural dialogue in the form of presence to one 
another as corporeal, embodied subjects who co- construct meanings. This 
chapter rests on an alternative understanding of intercultural interaction 
that relies on a dialogic idea of communication closely connected to the 
experiential sphere and the bodily aspects of lived human subjectivity. This 
largely theoretical chapter is followed by the critique of three models of 
competence in Chap. 4: Deardorff’s pyramid model (2011a, b), the 
ICOPROMO project (Glaser et al. 2007) and Phipps’ notion of intercul-
tural competence in terms of dwelling (2007). This chapter considers the 
ethical implications of Levinas’s reflection on the nature of language and 
on the relationship between self and other for the development of a frame-
work that addresses the limitations of current conceptualisations of com-
petence in intercultural communication. In particular, Chap. 4 enters in a 
productive confrontation with Phipps and her notion of intercultural com-
petence as dwelling. Phipps utilises the Heideggerian metaphor of lan-
guage as a dwelling place and the activity of learning another language as 
preparation to dwell in a new place. As intended by Phipps, dwelling in a 
language represents the result of an intercultural experience that provides 
the language learner with a sense of the fleeting and fragile nature of com-
munication between people who may not share the same cultural perspec-
tive. Due to Heidegger’s conservative view of the inextricable bond 
between culture, language and soil as markers of a shared identity, this 
chapter proposes an alternative notion of the intercultural in terms of 
sojourning (Cavell 1996, 2005), as more apt to describe the condition of 
precarity and ‘messiness’ of intercultural living.
MeThodological consideraTions
This book reflects the state of flux and theoretical development of intercul-
tural communication research, particularly in the formulation of non- 
essentialist approaches to the conceptualisation of intercultural understanding 
and of ethical responsibility in communication. This situation in research is 
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exemplified by Martin and Nakayama (2010) who argue that this particular 
field of research has currently not achieved a unified methodological 
approach. For this reason, intercultural communication remains open to 
new theoretical interventions, particularly in redefining the role of culture 
in underpinning the dynamics of intercultural interaction:
After ten years, revisiting the contemporary terrain of Intercultural com-
munication seems warranted. The field has exploded in many different 
directions that have opened up the very notion of ‘intercultural’ communi-
cation. In some ways, the term itself, ‘intercultural’, tends to presume the 
interaction between discrete and different cultures. (…). Ten years later, the 
very problem of conceptualising ‘intercultural communication’ remains as 
vibrant and relevant as ever. (Martin and Nakayama 2010, p. 59)
Orbe (2007) summarises the limitations of traditional empirical method-
ological frameworks in capturing the complexity entailed in intercultural 
interaction as:
• Eurocentric bias. This bias is evident in the discourse of skills and 
competences in communication that emphasises conflict manage-
ment as the principal element in interaction between self and other.
• Essentialising generalizations. The other is simplified according to 
parameters such as culture, ethnicity or nationality.
• Assumptions of difference. Difference is attributed to contrasting 
cultural practices.
• Focus on micro-level practices. Research is based primarily on 
everyday communicative practices in small group situations.
It is suggested in this book that a methodological approach for inter-
cultural communication should include the following:
• To counteract assumptions of difference by redefining the relation-
ship between self and other within an ethical frame. This ethical 
framework is based on the Levinasian distinction between the two 
modes of discourse of the saying and the said.
• To confront Eurocentric bias and essentialism with a critique of com-
municative competence.
• To focus on macro-level practices, examining how interaction is 




intra- and inter-cultural contexts, creating power asymmetries 
between self and other.
These aims reflect the methodological difficulty of dealing with the 
complexity of the world in which interactions take place. In accounting for 
this tendency to enclose complexity within methodological frameworks, 
which derive from paradigms set in Western scientific metaphysical tradi-
tion, Law (2004) suggests the widening of the notion of methodology in 
order to include uncertainty and singularity. Law describes methodology 
as a process of delimiting the boundaries between what is made manifest 
in research and those aspects that are made absent, or excluded, in the act 
of defining a field of investigation. The idea that presence and absence are 
mutually constitutive originates in the critique of metaphysics initiated by 
Adorno (1973, 2008) and Benjamin (1999), which focused on the 
attempt to retrieve the marginal aspects of existence that have been 
excluded from philosophical investigation. According to their critique of 
metaphysical tradition, one of the principal aspects entailed in the act of 
delineating a concept consists in deciding what is omitted, in virtue of 
being marginal and non-essential to the definition of its identity. In this 
process of exclusion, thinking becomes organised in a series of dichoto-
mies: on the one side, the positive aspects that constitute the essence of a 
concept, and on the other, the negative and the marginal characteristics 
that are excluded from its definition. Indeed, this practice creates a uni-
form system of truth ordered according to a series of oppositions, which 
marginalise the particularity of the concrete and singular aspects of indi-
viduals and of existence in general. In other words, the process of delineat-
ing an area of investigation entails the creation of an absence. This absence 
remains as the hidden and repressed aspect of the observed reality, and it 
is made ‘other’ in the constitution of an object of knowledge,
All that is being said is that matters are relational: what is being made and 
gathered is in a mediated relation with whatever is absent, manifesting a part 
while Othering most of it. (Law 2004, p. 146)
This book reflects this dialectic between presence and absence in the field 
of intercultural communication with its critique of intercultural compe-
tence in which the other is considered from the perspective of the self. In 
the idea of communicative competence critiqued in Chap. 4, it is argued 
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that the voice of the other is absent, meaning that communication is 
 contemplated from the perspective of the self and not from the standpoint 
of interaction, in which self and other are reciprocal.
Another critical aspect regarding methodology is that of interdisciplin-
arity when researching intercultural communication. Being interdisciplin-
ary in nature, the field of intercultural communication encompasses three 
main disciplines, namely, psychology, anthropology and linguistics. 
Psychology analyses the role of human cognition in identifying the pat-
terns of behaviour of members of different cultures. Anthropology pro-
vides the tools to recognise cultural patterns and non-verbal communication. 
Linguistics examines the relation between language and cultural systems 
(Flammia and Sadri 2011). However, within these disciplinary fields inter-
cultural communication still relies on neat classifications of cultural differ-
ence and unquestioned definitions of otherness while some of the most 
complex and contested challenges gripping contemporary multicultural 
societies are left unexamined. It is argued in this book that an ethical 
approach to intercultural communication should venture outside these 
disciplinary fields and engage in the debates that are most poignant in the 
current climate of hostility towards ‘the other’: refugees and asylum seek-
ers, ethnic minorities, immigrants, women, the disabled, and LGBTQI. In 
dealing with understanding across cultures and perceptions of self and 
other, intercultural communication is best placed to intervene in debates 
that are relevant in multicultural societies, challenging unproblematised 
notions of otherness and examining critically the idea of relativism and of 
tolerance of different cultural practices when these present ethical dilem-
mas or aporias (O’Regan and MacDonald 2007). In this regard, in terms 
of integrating an ethical perspective to the field of intercultural communi-
cation, the possibilities offered by an interdisciplinary approach have not 
been exhausted. As an illustration of this point, Youngblood (2007) dis-
cusses inter-disciplinarity in terms of problem-oriented critical thinking 
that focuses on process rather than being limited to a specific disciplinary 
domain. This translates as the process of selecting analytical tools from a 
relevant discipline in order to advance solutions and promote deeper 
understanding. Examples of this approach are documented in other fields 
of research in which the messiness and precariousness of communication 
are evident, as in the presence of a dominant other in situations of clear 
inequality- for example in ethnographic research on asylum seekers in the 
Belgian legal system (Maryns and Blommaert 2002; Maryns 2006) and 




Belgium (Blommaert 2001, 2004). Similarly, Phipps (2014) brings 
 examples from the field of Peace and Security Studies (e.g. Lederach 2003; 
Schirch 2004), which are able to
offer frameworks and practices which may enable language and intercultural 
studies to move away from its insistence on Intercultural Dialogue and offer 
ways of working with acknowledged and inevitable identity loss and precar-
ity. (Phipps 2014, p. 120)
Phipps discusses this sense of precarity in the context of linguistic solidar-
ity, which designates the effort of ‘intercultural listeners’ (2012, p. 587) 
to accommodate one’s own language in the endeavour of communication, 
particularly when confronted with the traumatic experiences of asylum 
seekers using a foreign language under difficult circumstances. In this 
sense, research in intercultural communication is faced with the challenge 
to address openly issues of inequality and conflict, shifting from the pre-
dominant focus on business relations, intercultural training and language 
learning in higher education, to the development of viable alternative 
theoretical perspectives that redefine the ethical significance of intercul-
tural dialogue, a concept which “is challenged profoundly by the insecurities 
and precarities which now affect large numbers of people in the world” 
(Phipps 2014, p. 115). Indeed, Phipps’ reflection resonates with the ethi-
cal scope of this book, and invites an investigation into the possibility of 
including an ethics of communication in intercultural research. This book 
answers this call by delineating a Levinasian framework to address issues of 
hegemonic discourses and power imbalance that marginalise and otherise 
transversely across gender, sexuality, class, race, ethnicity, religion, nation-
ality and physical disability. An example of research that advocates this 
transversality of interests is Chávez’s (2013) argument in favour of the 
inclusion of queer and trans theories in intercultural communication, for 
example mapping the trans-national and trans-cultural circulation of 
notions of gayness and queerness. Chávez identifies a number of points of 
convergence between queer and trans studies and the critical turn in inter-
cultural communication, particularly the focus on gender, class and race in 
order to question not only normative modes of identity, but also modes of 
social and economic organization within the logic of the commodification 
of difference in political and economic neo-liberalism (see Kawai 2009 
and the commodification of cultural difference in tourism, Shepherd 
2002; Jack and Phipps 2005).
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self and oTher, a QuesTion of difference?
Thinking about self and other in intercultural communication entails 
engaging with and thinking about difference. Is difference the gap between 
self and other that needs to be bridged through intercultural awareness and 
the exercise of tolerance, or does difference connote uniqueness, imma-
nence and embodiment in the relation self/other? Warren’s (2008) con-
ceptualisation of difference is of great interest in clarifying this distinction. 
According to Warren, communication studies limit the understanding of 
difference to that of representing an opposition to a normative construct. 
This means that difference is perceived in terms of a negative, “something 
that hurts or constrains us” (Warren 2008, p. 295), whether it is construed 
in terms of racial, ethnic, gendered or linguistic difference. What is argued 
in this book is that accentuating the role of cultural difference creates 
essentialist competency models that help individuals navigate the ‘strange-
ness’ of the other. This simplified notion of difference appears in the neo-
essentialist attribution of cultural difference to the other, understood in 
terms of a problem that can be fixed through the discovery of commonali-
ties between cultural traditions, which allow people to communicate inter-
culturally, or through the practice of cultural tolerance of the other as 
‘different from us’. In this instance, the focus on difference is apolitical, 
abstracted from the contextual factors that attribute cultural difference as a 
trait of the other. Furthermore, this etiolated notion of difference is pres-
ent in the contraposition between marginal cultural realities versus hege-
monic cultural ideologies (Warren 2001), in which the marginal becomes 
essentialised and idealized. These factors simplify the rich theoretical rami-
fications that a more developed conceptualization of difference would 
bring forward in the field of communication. Rather than being relegated 
to representing a negative moment or reduced to a binary distinction 
between marginal and hegemonic cultural realities, difference can become 
a sign of embodiment, immanence and uniqueness, or particularity, as 
Warren explains:
My first major discovery, as a thinker about culture, is that difference need 
not be coded in the negative, as an opposition (i.e., I’m different from you), 
but could be seen as an affirmation (i.e., I’m unique and so are you). In 
many ways, this is an elementary idea: difference is the inevitable thread that 
makes us who we are and that can be a beautiful thing. This is not the same 




say that there is variability within presumed categories of people and if we 
want to understand how power works we need to invest careful attention to 
particularity and avoid the trappings of binary logics. (Warren 2008, p. 295)
This positive affirmation of difference in intercultural communication 
advocated in this book assumes the outlines of the concrete other as it is 
conceptualized in Levinasian ethics, through the ideas of immanence and 
bodily presence in Chaps. 3 and 4.
PhilosoPhical inQuiry in inTerculTural 
coMMunicaTion
Philosophical inquiry is adopted in this book as a means to “unravel con-
ceptual knots” (Blake et al. 2003, p. 16) through a problematizing per-
spective, which is influenced by the contribution of Pennycook (2001) in 
the field of applied linguistics. In his work, problematizing practice, or ‘the 
restive problematization of the given’ (Pennycook 2001, p. 107), redefines 
the contributions of poststructuralist, postmodernist and postcolonial 
thought positioning itself in a relation to knowledge that questions 
assumptions, concepts and categories as the product of the relationship 
between power and knowledge,
Poststructuralism (and postmodernism) becomes a skepticism about com-
mon assumptions, a questioning of givens, (…). One strategy by which this 
is sometimes achieved is through pluralisation: Knowledge (capitalisation in 
the original) becomes knowledges, subjectivity becomes subjectivities. 
Beyond the often obscure discussion of the sign, subjectivity, and discourse, 
poststructural-ism becomes a way of thinking, a tendency to always question 
given categories (human nature, universalism, the individual, culture, lan-
guage, knowledge) and to try to explore how these categories are not so 
much real qualities of the world but are the products of particular cultural 
and historical ways of thinking. (Pennycook 2001, p. 107)
Here Pennycook refers to one of the tenets of post- structuralist thinking, 
namely the relation between knowledge and power. For Foucault (2010), 
power is embodied in social practices and in discourses that create regimes 
of truth, meaning the organisation of accepted forms of knowledge and 
the division between what is true and false. According to Lyotard (1984) 
technological advancement transforms knowledge from the old concept of 
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development of the individual mind to a commodity at the service of 
industrial, military and political strategies. Problematizing practice, in this 
context, recognises the power relations that are embedded in knowledge 
and seeks to articulate the ways in which they are reproduced in a particu-
lar field of investigation, in the specific, intercultural communication. 
Dean (1994) distinguishes between three forms of intellectual practice. 
The first model is progressivist theory and the high modernist ideal of the 
Enlightenment, characterised by the ideal of progress and technological 
advancement. This model adopts the language of natural science to deduce 
causal explanations that are applied to the social field. The second form of 
theory is represented by critical theory, which critiques modernist reason 
as presenting a technocratic vision of rational advancement. In this model, 
reason is embedded in social and cultural practices that reposition rational 
advancement in terms of emancipation. Finally, the third model is repre-
sented by problematizing practice, “the disturbance of narratives of both 
progress and reconciliation” (Dean 1994, p.  4). This form of theory is 
rooted in the practice of formulating questions, rather than seeking a solu-
tion based on either an idea of progress or of emancipation. In the analysis 
of the constitution of the field of knowledge of intercultural communica-
tion, it is thus important to differentiate between a critique from the posi-
tion of a legislating subject “passing judgement on a deficient reality” 
(Dean 1994, p.  119) and the problematization of assumptions that 
become taken for granted in a discursive practice. Similarly, Koetting and 
Malisa (2004) identify three aims of philosophical inquiry: to theorise, to 
analyse and to critique with an approach that is interpretive (interest in 
understanding) or critical (interest in emancipation). The process of philo-
sophical inquiry is thus summarised: an initial conceptual analysis that situ-
ates the issue under investigation in the context of a philosophical tradition, 
and the examination of its epistemological and axiological assumptions 
that is either interpretive or critical. Another significant distinction is the 
one outlined by Biesta (2001, 2009) between critical dogmatism, tran-
scendental critique and deconstruction, which offers a starting point from 
which to articulate a problematization of intercultural communication. 
According to Biesta, critical dogmatism consists in examining a situation 
critically, adopting a specific criterion of evaluation. One example is the 
criterion of emancipation, adopted in critical pedagogy to evaluate exist-
ing educational systems. However, Biesta argues that this form of critique 
is dogmatic because it “derives its right to be critical from the truth of the 




tion) is not evaluated critically. Transcendental critique begins with the 
articulation of the conditions of possibility of knowledge initiated by Kant 
with his Critiques (1987, 2004, 2007), which relied on the presupposition 
of the existence of the Cartesian cogito, the ‘I think’, meaning a universal 
legislating subject. In the context of the Frankfurt School, Habermas 
(1984, 1987) grounds transcendental critique in the philosophy of lan-
guage, through the notion of communicative ethics and its model of ratio-
nality based on mutual understanding and consensual action. From this 
perspective, Derrida’s problematization of the tenets of Habermasian 
communicative action, particularly the concept of an ideal speech situa-
tion, introduces a radical approach to the notion of critique, through the 
practice of deconstruction. The term deconstruction (Derrida 1997) dif-
fers from critical analysis since its aim does not reside in uncovering a sta-
ble ground in order to establish a critical distance from a clearly defined 
object of knowledge. Rather, deconstruction puts into question the pos-
sibility of a stable ground and the unity of objects of knowledge, and 
focuses instead on the instability of meanings and of metaphysical opposi-
tions (Wortham 2010). The focus on non-reciprocity, asymmetry and 
faults in mutual recognition (Bernstein 2006; Critchley 2006) directs the 
practice of deconstruction towards the singularity of the other and the 
play of differences, or “différance”, between signs and signifiers that is 
constitutive of language (Derrida 1984, 1997). This practice allows to 
deconstruct relations and assumptions rooted in the “philosophy, history, 
culture and politics of the Western tradition” (Wortham 2010, p. 37), and 
as such it constitutes the basis of problematizing practice as it is adopted 
in this book.
The role of levinasian eThics in ProbleMaTizing 
inTerculTural coMMunicaTion
The philosophy of Levinas is concerned primarily with ethics, and particu-
larly with the relation between self and other. For Levinas, ethics is think-
ing about the other, and this preoccupation with otherness, or alterity, 
represents the principal theme around which his reflection on the nature 
of thinking, language and knowledge is organized. According to Levinasian 
ethics, the certainties held by the self are destabilised upon encountering 
the other,
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For the ethical relationship which subtends discourse is not a species of con-
sciousness whose ray emanates from the I; it puts the I in question. This 
putting in question emanates from the other. (Levinas 1969, p. 195)
A dialogic understanding of intercultural encounters is underpinned by this 
particular aspect of Levinasian ethics and more specifically on two distinct 
types of relation between self and other. In the first modality, the relation 
with the other happens through cultural categories, which fix the encounter 
within parameters that have been defined in advance, prior to the encoun-
ter. In the second modality, the self is exposed to the other in an ethical 
relation. To express the complex character of otherness embedded in this 
ethical relation, Levinas distinguishes between two terms: autrui (the other 
person) and autre (otherness, or alterity). The accepted convention in 
translation is to capitalise the word Other in reference to autrui, although 
this book adopts Cohen’s argument that the distinction between autrui 
and autre is not always consistent in the original text,
Still, it must be said, Levinas often uses autre where he could very well have 
used autrui; one should avoid making a fetish of this distinction and pay 
attention to context. (Cohen 1987, p. viii)
Therefore, in this book the word other is employed without capitalisation 
in reference to autrui, the other person, whilst the word otherness, or 
alterity, is employed in reference to autre. The adoption of this aspect of 
Levinasian ethics has a twofold implication: first, it offers a framework for 
the dialogic reconceptualisation of interculturalism, and second it allows 
the recognition of the other not as an abstract entity but in terms of a 
corporeal, or embodied, self.
conclusion
Repositioning intercultural communication practice within a new para-
digm entails a recognition of the impossibility to achieve a formula to fix 
communication, and the focus on Levinasian ethics assumes risk taking 
and open ended dialogue as guides for intercultural praxis. Thus, philo-
sophical reflection delineates a conception of subjectivity based on dialo-
gism and defined by interaction with the other according to Levinasian 
ethics. The philosophical standpoint adopted in this book situates inter-




to power asymmetries between self and other, emphasising their imma-
nent and embodied relation. It is argued in this book that an analysis of 
the theoretical tenets upon which intercultural communication builds its 
interpretive framework, as well as a more critical approach to the ideas of 
relativism and tolerance, should become more visible in research in this 
field. In this sense, this book seeks to promote interdisciplinary connec-
tions to promote dialogue and critical engagement with wider issues 
beyond the micro-analysis of individual intercultural learning journeys.
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CHAPTER 2
A Critical Framework for Intercultural 
Communication
Abstract This chapter illustrates current approaches to critical intercul-
tural communication and it engages with the theoretical presuppositions 
in the work of leading critical interculturalists. The aim of this chapter is 
to discuss the philosophical underpinnings of these critical intercultural 
frameworks that are paradigmatic of perspectivism, social constructivism 
and emancipatory critique. This critical reading problematizes two of the 
constructs that are more commonly employed in intercultural communi-
cation: the role of tolerance in shaping the relation between self and other, 
and the idea of intercultural awareness as a narrative of reconciliation and 
final erasure of all differences.
Keywords Critical intercultural citizenship • Critical cultural awareness 
• Critical cosmopolitan potential • Subalternity and interculturalism • 
Hegelian dialectics and intercultural consciousness • Negative dialectics 
and interculturalism
IntroductIon
While intercultural communication is theorised from a number of onto-
logical and epistemological positions, the possibility of defining its con-
tents, aims and characteristics as an object of knowledge and as an object 
of human experience remains at the centre of attempts to delineate the 
often blurred contours of this field. Critical approaches to intercultural 
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communication in particular are concerned with a theoretical preoccupa-
tion that seeks to establish the ontological status of the intercultural self as 
a result of the relation between the self and a cultural other in interaction. 
Is it indeed conceivable to attribute an ontological change to the self, a 
change in being, following an intercultural experience? As intercultural 
encounters are viewed in terms of situated, dynamic and shifting relations, 
critical interculturalism searches for theoretical positions that foreground 
the ethical aspect of these encounters, whilst incorporating issues relating 
to unequal power relations and the relationship between structure and 
agency. From this perspective, critical intercultural communication 
engages chiefly with the partial, contested and situated nature of language 
and the often difficult negotiation of meaning in intercultural encounters. 
This aspect becomes most visible in situations where there is a power 
imbalance (Blommaert 1991; Nakayama and Halualani 2010; Holliday 
2011), in the context of language learning (Byram and Risager 1999), liv-
ing in a foreign country (Holliday 2010; Jackson 2011) and tourism 
(Phipps 2007). What emerges is an increasing attention towards issues of 
inequality, asymmetries and power relations, which are discussed in this 
chapter through a close reading of five critical intercultural frameworks 
that are paradigmatic of the current status of critical approaches to inter-
culturality: the perspectivism of Jensen (2003) and Monceri (2003, 2009), 
the liquid interculturality of Dervin (2011), and the emancipatory stance 
adopted by Holliday (2011, 2013) and Guilherme (2002).
culture ‘under erasure’
In the context of language acquisition for tourism purposes, Phipps 
describes the experience of the language learner confronted with the chal-
lenging task of negotiating meaning in the course of intercultural interac-
tion. Warning against the idea of the acquisition of intercultural 
competences as a quick fix to resolving conflict and misunderstanding, 
Phipps emphasises instead the complexity of communication and ‘the mess 
of human relatedness in languages’ (Phipps 2007, p. 26), referring to the 
Heideggerian notion of language as an expression of our dwelling in the 
world. This existential dimension is becoming increasingly prominent in 
intercultural research, bringing to the surface the endeavour, and often 
the failure, to negotiate meaning that characterises human communica-
tion, both inter- and intra-cultural. In this regard, Phipps (2013) interro-




herself in the face of the ethical challenges entailed in researching in mul-
tilingual contexts.
Regarding the focus on cultural difference in the analysis of communi-
cation in intercultural contexts, Koole and ten Thije (2001) argue that, 
although justified from an ethnographic perspective, this focus leads 
researchers to overlook other characteristics of discourse, such as power 
relations between dominant and non-dominant groups, resulting in ana-
lytical stereotyping and overgeneralizations. Thus, the a priori reliance on 
cultural difference in the analysis of intercultural interactions highlighted 
by Blommaert (1991) can be contrasted with other approaches that 
emphasise power relations and the societal institutions within which the 
interactions take place, through a situational and discursive approach (e.g. 
Gumperz 1982; Scollon and Scollon 1995; Koole and ten Thije 2001). 
Here, the Bakhtinian idea that language is inhabited by centripetal and 
centrifugal forces provides an apt reminder that language is the site of a 
struggle between the system of linguistic norms that form the idea of a 
unitary language and the reality of heteroglossia. According to Bakhtin, 
centripetal forces embody the idea of a unitary language which operates in 
the midst of heteroglossia, or the stratification of language in dialects. 
Here Bakhtin refers particularly to dialects as socio-ideological expres-
sions, languages that belong to social groups and that ensure the constant 
development and vitality of language itself, “the uninterrupted processes of 
decentralization and disunification” (Bakhtin 2006, p. 272). Each indi-
vidual utterance represents a recognisable speech act in a defined system of 
rules but at the same time it is placed in the living and unique context in 
which it is uttered. Therefore, the idea of culture becomes problematic 
when used as an explanatory tool for behaviour or when talk around cul-
tural belonging is taken at face value, without interrogating the context of 
the interaction and the role of the researcher in eliciting, recording and 
interpreting empirical data. However, can interculturalists avoid using this 
much maligned term lest they incur the danger of being labelled essential-
ist, the ultimate capital sin in critical interculturalism? What else is available 
to describe intercultural encounters? In this sense, it is mandatory to rec-
ognise one’s own ‘metaphysical complicity’ (Derrida 2010, p. 235) with 
the language adopted in intercultural communication, particularly with 
the use of the word culture. However, it is possible to follow Derrida in 
the idea that the movement of difference between sign and signifier 
expresses the impossibility to inscribe meaning in a totality, making it pos-
sible to place the word culture under erasure: in calling a word into 
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 question I also recognise the fact that no other word is available (Derrida 
1997; Bradley 2008). When placing temporarily the term culture under 
erasure, the word can be seen in terms of styling (Coupland 2007), mean-
ing the shaping of social meanings through the use of semiotic resources. 
This understanding is opposed to an essentialist interpretation that turns 
culture into a natural entity inscribed within national boundaries, which 
Street (1993) attributes to the use of nominalisation imported from scien-
tific discourse. This notion of culture is opposed to the idea of culture as a 
verb, something that is enacted, implying that meanings are contingent 
and unstable, constantly negotiated in everyday life and that culture is a 
discursive construction built in interaction. Furthermore, cultural dis-
courses are not neutral products but inhabit social spaces embedded in 
power relationships and can be used to disguise material inequalities, for 
example attributing underachievement in education to culture rather than 
addressing its underlying socio-economic dimension (Phillips 2007). For 
this reason, Street suggests the use of the notion of hegemony, which 
Gramsci (2007) employed to designate the control exercised throughout 
society by a dominant group. Hegemony describes ‘patterns and con-
straints of social life at the same time as recognising- in a post-modern sense- 
their multivocal and contradictory character’ (Street 1993, p. 37). In this 
sense, the word hegemony is best fit to highlight the interrelationship 
between the top down imposition of dominant discourses and the dynamic 
complex of forces that reproduce and transform them. Therefore, the 
word culture will be used hereafter according to this last definition: in 
terms of a constant struggle between the instability of discursive patterns 
of interaction and the habit of inscribing these within a totality.
PersPectIvIst Intercultural communIcatIon
Jensen (2003) identifies two strands of intercultural communication: a 
functionalist approach focused on cultural difference and a post- 
structuralist approach. The latter examines communication from the per-
spective of the individual participants and highlights the process of 
interaction from their respective interpretations. Jensen employs 
Yoshikawa’s (1987) double swing model based on the idea that commu-
nication is an infinite process in the course of which the participants 
undergo a transformation. In this model participants are considered to act 
simultaneously as both addressee and addresser, after Buber’s (2004) 




 dualism of yin and yang in Taoist teaching (Chen 2008). Through inter-
cultural interaction, self and other are able to develop a dynamic in-
betweenness (Yoshikawa 1987), meaning the ability to inhabit different 
identities. Jensen’s model is developed from a post-structuralist approach 
that emphasises the fact that interactants are engaged in an ongoing pro-
cess that is based on ‘positions of experience’, or in other words on subjec-
tive, individual perspectives. Jensen bases this idea on the horizon of 
experience (Gadamer 1976) as a hermeneutical tool to interpret intercul-
tural encounters not only in terms of cultural difference, but taking into 
account the horizon, meaning the social spaces inhabited by the partici-
pants. This positioning, argues Jensen, is constructed discursively during 
interaction but it is at the same time anchored in social structures, which 
delimit the sphere of action of the individual.
Monceri (2003, 2009) adopts a similar perspectivism, beginning with a 
critique of Western rationality. Similarly to Yoshikawa, Monceri (2003) 
argues that Western rationality is founded on the idea of a unique and 
indivisible self, able to comprehend reality in its essential elements. 
Monceri challenges this dichotomy between the knowing subject and the 
objects of knowledge adopting the notion of will to power (Nietzsche 
1968). Accepting the impossibility to determine a stable and universal 
standpoint from which the self would be able to formulate claims of truth 
about the world, with the idea of perspectivism Nietzsche represents 
knowledge as a will to power that orders the flux of reality from an indi-
vidual perspective. Thus, the self strives to impose order on reality creating 
an unchangeable set of identities, in order to establish an appearance of 
stability to the flux of phenomena in the empirical world, which is ever 
changing and shifting. According to Monceri, this process becomes appar-
ent in the presence of an intercultural encounter, when the definite sense 
of identity of the self, built upon the idea of the rational apprehension of 
the real, is challenged by the encounter with an unknown other who 
eludes the categories imposed by self. This means that, from the stand-
point of perspectivism, the categories of self and other become problem-
atic, because intercultural encounters demonstrate that the reality upon 
which these categories are based changes depending on context and on 
perspective. In this sense, according to perspectivism the intercultural self 
is not transcultured, meaning the end point of a process of acculturation, 
but it is transculturing, meaning that the self is in a constant state of 
change and becoming. This state of flux is transferred to the theory of 
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intercultural communication by problematizing the search for consensus 
and highlighting the precarity of communication,
What perspectivism teaches us is that there is no way out to find only one 
theory of intercultural communication able to solve all eventual misunder-
standings, and that the only possibility left is to elaborate tentative working 
hypothesis starting from the consideration of concrete interactions between 
individuals, since individuals and not cultures are the proper partners of any 
communication process. (Monceri 2003, p. 111)
Therefore, Monceri claims that the self is processual, which entails that 
there are no stable or natural identities (for example sexual or gender 
based identities), and thus only temporary selves that arise from interac-
tion with others and with society at large,
Identity, in its turn, points to the infinite punctual selves in which we are 
compelled to stop the flux of becoming in order to interact with one another, 
and particularly to meet the requests for identification on the part of our 
social and cultural institutions. (Monceri 2009, p. 52)
To this, Monceri adds the dimension of power relations that attempt to 
dispel the chaos of becoming and replace it with “the (apparent) order of 
being” (ibid.). In this conception of the transculturing self, power repre-
sents a pervasive force that fixes identity, rendering possible the identifica-
tion of the self in everyday interactions. However, in doing so, the flux of 
reality is interrupted and the self is congealed within an identity, instead of 
continuing the process of transformation, or metamorphosis.
With the notion of the transculturing self, Monceri provides a complex 
description of intercultural communication based on the provisional and 
contextual negotiation of meaning in which the self plays an active role as 
a shifting and hybrid identity. The state of constant becoming of the trans-
culturing self recalls the notion of nomadic subjectivity (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1999), stemming from Nietzsche’s critique of the ability of the 
transcendental subject to confer unity to the empirical world. This notion 
of a nomadic subjectivity that destabilizes fixed identities in order to affirm 
difference and becoming allows a shift in the conceptualisation of differ-
ence framed within the context of cultural belonging to difference as a 
performative and creative act (Warren 2008). However, in counteracting 




that culture is regarded as a construct independent of human activity, this 
radical form of subjectivity falls under the opposing category of volun-
tarism (Bhaskar 1998), according to which society is entirely the product 
of human action. According to Bhaskar we are ‘thrown’ into a pre-existing 
social context, and as a consequence there exists a duality in which indi-
viduals both reproduce (unconscious production) and occasionally trans-
form (conscious production) society (Bhaskar 1998, p. 35). For Bhaskar 
there are two errors in the conceptualisation of the relation between 
human agency and society: one is the error of reification, according to 
which society exists independently of human activity and the other is the 
error of voluntarism, according to which society is the product of human 
action. It is possible to identify the two errors in both essentialist intercul-
tural communication, with cultural categories that determine individual 
behaviour, and in perspectivist models that emphasise the idea of a shifting 
identity over social determinations,
Society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and con-
ventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not 
exist unless they did so. (Bhaskar 1998, p. 36)
From this perspective, it is important to articulate more clearly the ways in 
which these power relations and societal structures are manifested in inter-
cultural encounters.
Post-modernIsm and the PolItIcs of InterculturalIty
Dervin proposes a conception of interculturalism based on the intersub-
jective and relational construction of meaning in interaction. Liquid inter-
culturalism (Dervin 2011) is presented as an alternative to solid 
interculturality, which is characterised by its reliance on cultural categori-
zation, whereas in the liquid model culture is a co-construction that is 
acted by interactants during communication. The two categories-solid 
and liquid, are established by Bauman (2000) with a contrast between 
twentieth century modernity and twenty-first century contemporary 
modernity: the first described as solid, heavy, condensed and systemic, 
with an inherent tendency towards totalitarianism and the latter as liquid, 
devoid of historical finality, characterized by fragmentation and the priva-
tization of individual existence. Bauman illustrates this contrast with a 
reflection on the shift from modernist emancipatory critical thinking to an 
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inward turn towards reflective critique in contemporary, liquid 
modernity.
The modernizing impulse, in any of its renditions, means the compulsive 
critique of reality. Privatization of the impulse means compulsive self- critique 
born of perpetual self-disaffection: being an individual de jure means having 
no one to blame for one’s own misery, seeking the causes of one’s own 
defeats nowhere except in one’s own indolence and sloth, and looking for 
no remedies other than trying harder and harder still. (Bauman 2000, p. 38)
In liquid modernity the individual performs his/her own sense of identity, 
and is responsible for the outcomes of this performance, a consequence of 
the critical impulse having been transformed into a self-reflective endeav-
our. Liquid modernity is represented as the era of inconsequential time, 
meaning that temporality is reduced to instantaneity, in which spatial dis-
tances can be covered with the speed of electronic signals. For Bauman, 
the ability to traverse different time/spaces with ease signals the ultimate 
sign of privilege in contemporary liquid modernity.
In the appropriation of liquid modernity as a constructivist model of 
interculturality in which culture is constantly negotiated and performed by 
interactants in communication, Dervin substitutes the notion of culture, 
which he regards a solid concept, with that of space/time, indicating the 
fluidity of liquid modernity. The liquid intercultural approach is thus 
summarised,
In other words, researchers, who wish to take a critical and ‘liquid’ stance 
towards intercultural discourses, shouldn’t be interested in the question 
‘what’s the student’s culture/identity/intercultural competence/sense of 
acculturation?’ But rather ‘how do they construct their culture/ identity /
intercultural competence/sense of acculturation?’ (Dervin 2011, p. 41)
However, in employing the concept of space-time to designate cultural 
negotiation, Dervin overlooks the structural disparity of access to different 
time-spaces due to asymmetrical relations of privilege signaled by Bauman, 
pointing instead to a culturalist bias in research. According to this cultural-
ist bias, researchers adopt a solid cultural interpretative stance towards 
research data, instead of a liquid interpretation of communicative utter-
ances in intercultural encounters as instances of different time-spaces tra-




this culturalist bias persists despite the theoretical acceptance of the notion 
of the multifaceted and hybrid nature of identity- or liquid interculturality. 
Dervin (2011) highlights an example of this theoretical acceptance of liq-
uid interculturality, which is subsequently abandoned in favour of a solid 
interpretation of data, in the literature concerning the intercultural experi-
ences of Chinese students. In this instance, the culturalist bias of research-
ers in interpreting data surfaces in cultural categorization and stereotyping, 
despite the theoretical acknowledgement of the fluidity of cultural 
allegiances.
One aspect that has not been sufficiently emphasised in Dervin’s liquid 
approach is represented by the modalities in which structural constraints 
such as economic disadvantage, class and linguistic inequality might influ-
ence the agency of the interlocutors in a communicative exchange and 
their ability to traverse different time/spaces. This aspect is addressed in 
the context of what Dervin et al. (2011) define the politics of intercultur-
ality, with a critique of constructivist intercultural analysis that views the 
individual as a free agent able to switch between identities unconstrained 
from societal and economic structures,
Certain constructivist views, having replaced openly culturalist theories, are 
nonetheless as problematic as the latter when they position individuals as 
free of all influences and capable of choosing their identifications—this is 
precisely what “soft” postmodern relativism does. (Dervin et  al. 2011, 
p. 11)
With the term the politics of interculturality, the authors refer to the pleth-
ora of terms that surround the area of intercultural studies (i.e. cross- 
cultural, multicultural, transcultural) and argue that the coinage of new 
terminology reflects specific socio-political and historical contexts. 
Although the creation and adoption of new terms demonstrate the attempt 
to avoid essentialism and culturalism, the result betrays a common ideo-
logical agenda regarding the construction of otherness,
all of these terms invoke perceptions of social reality, together with the ide-
ologies and the a priori perceptions that underlie them, but do not consti-
tute descriptions of the social realities themselves. Moreover, debates about 
the merits of one of these words to the detriment of the others tend to 
overshadow the fact that all of them invoke the same basic assumption, that 
is, that different cultures exist. Encounters between them are then immedi-
ately qualified as problematic—or unnatural at the very least—as cultures are 
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seen as corresponding to distinct geographical spaces. The attention paid to 
the differences between these terms obscures the fact that they convey a 
similar perspective on the world, on human societies and on the way they are 
supposed to function. (Dervin et al. 2011, p. 5)
This means that all the different approaches share the same conceptualisa-
tion of otherness in terms of a dichotomous relation between self and the 
cultural other, thus emphasising difference, and hence the problematic 
character of intercultural interaction, over commonalities. From this per-
spective, the authors continue, there are two basic assumptions that char-
acterise intercultural research: on the one side, the reliance on the concept 
of culture creates a polar contraposition between ‘us’ and ‘the other’, thus 
implying a divide between cultures. On the other, this process of contra-
position and otherisation fosters discourses of insurmountable differences 
between coexisting cultures in multicultural societies and the demand for 
the creation of political instruments to resolve conflicts thereby generated. 
In this way, the authors point at the political agenda behind the emergence 
of the term intercultural, particularly the otherisation of migrants and the 
need to regulate migratory flows within national borders, policies towards 
minorities and processes of assimilation and acculturation. Hidden behind 
this political dimension, the authors identify the social construction of 
otherness that ascribes the intercultural label in the presence of asymmetri-
cal social relations,
Described as an encounter with “others” (or a certain kind of other), the 
‘intercultural’ explicitly or implicitly reduces the other to this single ele-
ment—the “cultural”—while minimising or erasing characteristics of the 
social identities of the interlocutors, such as gender, age, personal life trajec-
tories and other elements that can make all the difference—or their com-
monality. Thus, designating certain situations as ‘intercultural’ supposes 
positioning oneself as an implicit, normative agent. (Dervin et  al. 2011, 
p. 12)
In other words, the danger in analysing and labelling encounters and 
experiences as ‘intercultural’ is rooted in the implicit reproduction of 
power relations in which the subject positions of the participants are 
assigned according to the prevalent discourses of a given socio-political 
context, albeit hidden behind the label of cultural difference. The authors 




emphasis on cultural difference and the meeting with a cultural other, to 
interculturality which focuses on the processuality of these encounters. 
This processuality accounts for the fact that identity is not fixed, but it is 
the result of the interactions that individuals experience in society. 
Individuals are viewed as dialogic entities constantly evolving through 
interaction, able to draw upon a range of resources available to them: dis-
cursive, economic, political and social. This notion of the individual coun-
teracts narrow labelling and cultural categorization, or cultural 
neo-essentialism, and while it is recognized that individuals are conscious 
agents and not simply representatives of a specific culture, the authors 
acknowledge the presence of unequal social relations,
The multiple ways individuals construct social relations and meanings can-
not reduce them to mere “representatives” of a given culture. The inter-
locutors in the spotlight in our research are full-fledged agents who may 
make conscious and considered choices, and not culturalised objects sup-
posedly controlled by their cultural identities. This, however, does not pre-
vent us from noting the presence and the force of unequal social relations: 
we do not assert that they are completely free in making these choices, but 
rather that margins for manoeuvre exist and that they are utilised both in 
everyday life and when special events take place (rites of passage, death…). 
(ibid.)
From this perspective, the interplay between agency and structure becomes 
predominant in determining the relation between self and other in inter-
cultural encounters. As Block argues, despite clear acknowledgments of 
social structures in intercultural communication, for example in the work 
of Holliday and Piller, it is crucial to determine the relationship between 
structure and agency and make clear the extent to which participants in 
applied linguistics and language and intercultural communication research 
are in control of their own agency,
Are they totally constrained by the social structures which envelope them 
and shape the activity in which they engage? Or are they free to act as they 
please in the different domains of activity in which they find themselves on 
a day-to-day basis? (Block 2013, p. 142)
When framed as mutually exclusive, the relationship between structure 
and agency reproduces the dichotomy between essentialist intercultural 
communication, in which the individual is constrained within the 
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 boundaries determined by cultural identity (as in essentialist intercultural 
research, e.g. Hall 1995; Hofstede and Hofstede 2004), and constructiv-
ist notions of identity as emergent in social interaction (e.g Monceri’s 
interculturing self, 2003, 2009; Dervin’s liquid interculturality, 2011). A 
third way is adopted in Holliday’s (2011, 2013) recognition of the limits 
imposed by structural constraints on the agency of individuals in intercul-
tural encounters, while rejecting the cultural determinism and the indi-
vidualism of essentialist intercultural communication. Nevertheless, 
another conceptual knot presents itself in the form of discourses of aware-
ness and achievement of an emancipated intercultural consciousness, as 
adopted in Holliday’s notion of a critical cosmopolitan potential and in 
Guilherme’s critical awareness model.
hollIday and the crItIcal cosmoPolItan PotentIal
Holliday (2013) engages with the notion of structure by postulating a 
grammar of culture to interpret intercultural events. In this grammar of 
culture, the individual is shaped by social and political structures such as 
cultural resources (e.g. education, language, religion, traditions), eco-
nomic systems, national politics and global positioning, particularly in 
relation to Western and non-Western cultural perspectives. According to 
this framework, the personal trajectories of individuals are in constant dia-
logue with the structures that surround them, due to underlying universal 
cultural processes which are shared by everyone regardless of background 
and that allow the negotiation of the individual with the structural dimen-
sion. This ability to transcend national cultures and cross cultural bound-
aries enables the emerging of patterns that are common in human 
behaviour notwithstanding cultural identification. In this sense, a relevant 
aspect of Holliday’s grammar of culture is that the underlying universal 
cultural processes present two aspects: on the one side, the shared univer-
sal ability allows individuals to interact with the particular realities encoun-
tered, demonstrating the creative potential to engage with structures; on 
the other, that same universal ability is at the origin of cultural prejudice, 
representing ‘a common mechanism for making limited sense through easy 
answers’ (Holliday 2013, p.  1), meaning the tendency to simplify the 
unknown using cultural stereotypes. According to Holliday, critical think-
ing on identity and culture can be unlocked by engineering ‘the right read-
ings’ (Holliday 2011, p. 36). This means that critical cultural awareness 
can be fostered through the use of three interpretive strategies: thick 




Table 2.1. A crucial pedagogical task consists in uncovering those underly-
ing features and ‘unlearn’ the impact of ideology in shaping discourses of 
culture, particularly in the Western pretence of neutrality embedded in the 
belief of its scientific and technical superiority evident in the neo- 
essentialism of intercultural training, and in narratives of Orientalism (Said 
2003), based on the idea of the ‘foreign Other’ (Holliday 2011).
Ideology, according to Holliday, establishes a dichotomy between a 
Western self and a marginalised periphery and the task of uncovering its 
works constitutes an emancipatory practice through which social struc-
tures can be modified by social agency. In order to explain behaviour in 
intercultural contexts, Holliday (2011) contrasts two models of social 
theory- a structural functional model and social action theory. Structural- 
functionalism is attributed to Durkheim’s (1964) view that society repre-
sents an organic system composed of separate institutions that contribute 
to the whole. Holliday (2011) ascribes this theory to intercultural neo- 
essentialism, according to which individual behaviour is expression of a 
national culture and national cultures can be described and compared 
according to their respective characteristics. Social action theory asserts 
the independence of social action (e.g. Weber 1964), and thus the ability 
of individuals to negotiate the cultural resources available to them. Even 
in situations of manifest oppression, argues Holliday, the ability to think 
critically remains a characteristic of all individuals. In this model of social 
action, the individual negotiates an established culture, which is described 
as a dominant discourse embedded in the social structure, and through a 
personal journey creates a personal cultural identity that is emergent and 
evolving.
Holliday’s intercultural model is based on the notion of universal cul-
tural processes that allow individuals to negotiate cultural realities that can 
be traced to a post-structuralist notion of subjectivity, able to act creatively 
and shape cultural identity whilst engaging with powerful and dominant 
Table 2.1 The three interpretive strategies
Thick description Bracketing Making the familiar strange
Seeking the broader picture, 
looking for the hidden and 
unexpressed and encouraging 
‘exploratory juxtaposition of 






Transcending the intercultural 
line between ‘our culture’ and 
‘their culture’, uncovering the 
universality of underlying 
cultural processes through 
dialogue
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discourses (see Weedon 1987, on the ability of the individual to occupy 
subject positions within a web of discourses and power relations). At the 
same time, the idea that ideological falsifications can be unmasked through 
the adoption of critical cultural awareness, and the development of a criti-
cal cosmopolitan consciousness, is rooted in narratives of emancipatory 
praxis (e.g. the emancipatory practices of teachers who relate theory to 
praxis in order to fulfil their transformative role, rejecting the notions of 
knowledge as a banking system and accumulated capital in Freire 1996 
and Giroux 1993, and the framework for critical intercultural citizenship, 
Guilherme 2002). In this context, the critical cosmopolitan position advo-
cated by Holliday addresses the contradiction at the heart of cultural rela-
tivism as the impossibility to establish grounds for right action, and 
postulates in its place an underlying ability to interact in intercultural com-
munication that is common to all. This critical cosmopolitanism is based 
on two paradigms of culture- small culture and large culture (Holliday 
1999). The commonly accepted understanding of culture conforms to the 
large culture paradigm, based on the reduction to ethnic and national 
characters. The notion of small culture, however, emphasises the cohesive 
behaviour of small social groupings, without the culturist reduction to 
ethnic or national stereotypes.
In relation to the notion of large culture, Holliday claims that it is 
somehow unavoidable, “an inescapable occupational hazard in cultural 
analysis” (1999, p. 242) and, for this reason, he invites an increased aware-
ness of “what its conceptualisation involves” and its “ideological implica-
tions” (ibid.). In this sense, researchers need to monitor their own 
discourses and “the ideological orientation of their own small culture” 
(p.  259), and to understand through the use of discourse analysis 
(Fairclough 1995), the details of how small culture and discourse operate 
if they are to be truly resilient and able to make choices (Holliday 1999, 
p. 260). One contention in regard to Holliday’s analysis is that it operates 
within an unresolved dichotomy between a view of subjectivity in line with 
post-structuralism and a modernist emancipatory praxis aimed at uncover-
ing the false consciousness and “prejudice of the dominant imagined world” 
(Holliday 2011, p. 189), based on ideological falsifications and the per-
ceived superiority of Western cultural perspectives. To this dominant per-
spective, Holliday opposes the counter-discourse of the marginal world:
The marginal world represents the Periphery, or the vernacular, struggling 
for recognition (…). The marginal world remains half hidden by the estab-




Thus, the marginal world remains hidden under the ideological falsifica-
tions of the Centre. In this context, Holliday proposes three social facts 
(Durkheim 1982) that illustrate the reality of cultural chauvinism against 
non-Western cultures, albeit refusing Durkheim’s determinism and allow-
ing for the possibility of action through critical analysis and the conse-
quent uncovering of false consciousness:
 1. Ideology is a fact of social life, visible in language and everyday 
behaviour.
 2. Ideology is hidden through projecting technical superiority as a 
neutral fact.
 3. The Western self imagines a culturally deficient foreign other, sus-
tained through cultural and linguistic imperialism and the construc-
tion of regional, religious and ethnic cultures. (Adapted from 
Holliday 2011, p. 191)
Therefore, the aim of critical analysis resides in activating the underlying 
universal cultural processes and “see through the illusion” of ideology 
behind the chauvinism towards “the Periphery in the emergent cultural 
world” (Holliday 2011, p.  192). Despite the recognition that counter- 
discourses of the marginal world are also ideologically constructed and 
thus no more ‘real’ than dominant discourses, and that they are also in 
danger of false consciousness, there remains a dichotomy between 
“Western domination and chauvinism” (Holliday 2011, p. 190) and non- 
Western societies, the privileged locus of emergent counter-discourses to 
the ideological dominance of the West. This dichotomy indicates a higher 
reality that is uncovered through the exercise of critical awareness, which 
uncovers false ideological positions and essentialism. A similar critical 
approach is developed by Guilherme in the context of language education 
and intercultural citizenship.
GuIlherme: crItIcal Intercultural cItIzenshIP
Education is the focus of critical intercultural awareness (Guilherme 
2002), which is identified as the critical dimension in foreign language 
education and outlines the characteristics of the critical intercultural citi-
zen. Guilherme identifies the philosophical foundations of critical aware-
ness in critical theory and post-modernism, the latter discussed through 
the work of Lyotard (1984, 1988), Baudrillard (1994) and Derrida (1997, 
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2010). Regarding critical theory, Guilherme focuses on the emancipatory 
character of the Frankfurt School, particularly the notion of intersubjectiv-
ity that replaces the individualistic and atomistic individual of 
Enlightenment, according to which the individual could dominate the 
world through objectifying reason.
The aim of critical theory was identified by Horkheimer (1982) in the 
role of reason embedded in social relations, which acquires an emancipa-
tory character that brings about changes in society. This happens through 
the exercise of critical reason, beginning with the explanatory critique of 
society, and subsequently with the transformation of all the factors that 
limit human freedom and emancipation, in order to liberate human beings 
from “all the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer 1982, p. 244). 
Adopting Horkheimer’s perspective, Guilherme writes that: “Emancipation 
in this sense is achieved through critical thinking which for the early 
Frankfurtians had the aim of rescuing the oppressed as well as a declining 
culture” (Guilherme 2002, p. 68). Guilherme draws upon the theory of 
communicative action (Habermas 1984) with the emancipatory intent of 
identifying the obstacles to understanding through the analysis of inter-
subjective communication. In the theory of communicative action, truth 
is constructed discursively on the basis of four validity claims that consti-
tute an ideal speech situation: that what we say is comprehensible, that it 
is true, that there is a normative basis for the claim, and finally that it is a 
sincere expression of the speaker’s feelings (Habermas 1984; Outhwaite 
2009). If the four validity claims are observed within an ideal speech situ-
ation, it is possible to achieve a rational consensus between speakers. From 
this perspective, the importance of critical theory for critical culture aware-
ness resides in the view of reason as socially embedded and thus influenced 
by different cultural perspectives. Furthermore, according to Guilherme 
critical theory confers a political scope to critical interculturalism in uncov-
ering patterns of domination and ideological representations of culture,
The enhancement of the liberating power of critical rationality is, therefore, 
a valuable asset that the notion of critical cultural awareness borrows from 
Critical Theory. (Guilherme 2002, p. 89)
Guilherme combines the emancipatory character of critical rationality with 
post-modernist notions of hybridity and cultural criticism in the context of 
global politics and the electronically mediated character of contemporary 




and undecidability that characterize the post-modern critique of modernist 
narratives of rationality (Featherstone 1988; Vattimo 1988; Best and 
Kellner 1991, 1997). In this context, according to Guilherme the contri-
bution of post-modernism reinforces the role of cultural criticism in creat-
ing dissent and promoting diversity and change. This philosophical 
framework is translated in Guilherme’s emancipatory pedagogical practice, 
according to which teachers are regarded as intellectuals who relate theory 
to praxis in order to fulfill their transformative role, rejecting the notions of 
knowledge as a banking system and accumulated capital (Freire 1996; 
Giroux 1993) and changing the image of schools from sites of transmission 
of knowledge into sites where knowledge is produced through active criti-
cal practice. The ability to act interculturally requires that teachers become 
cultural mediators, in order to help students clarify their cultural identifica-
tions and emphasising the role of dialogue in developing critical and par-
ticipatory citizenship through the acquisition of skills and competences 
that allow the suspension of judgement and the ability to empathise with 
the values of others even when they are not compatible with our own 
(Byram 2008). The elements that are considered crucial factors in the 
development of critical intercultural citizenship (Phipps and Guilherme 
2004) can be grouped under the five categories of reflection, dissent, dif-
ference, dialogue and empowerment. Beginning with the development of 
cultural and political awareness through critical reflection, critical intercul-
tural learning will cause the self to recognise the existence of contrasting 
values and thus the need to negotiate with the other. In this way, the adop-
tion of a critical attitude towards perceptions of culture provides the nexus 
with critical action and the development critical intercultural responsibility. 
This sequence of learning is illustrated in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Critical intercultural citizenship










Ability to negotiate 
between ‘the Self 
and the Other’
Critical appraisal of 
linguistic and 
cultural canons and 
standards
Questioning of the 
perceived inferiority 
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A characteristic of critical pedagogy centred on intercultural commu-
nication is the relationship between two contrasting tendencies, one 
focused on emancipatory ideals that seek to counteract the idea of schools 
as places where inequality is reproduced as habitus (Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1977) and the other based on post-modern concerns with iden-
tity and culture. The focus on critical action that characterises this model 
of critical intercultural awareness presupposes a belief that people are not 
simply powerless towards structural constraints but that they can forge a 
space for agency and critical action within institutional spaces. In this 
context, Apple and Whitty argue that postmodern emphasis on the con-
tingent and the local contributes to the possibility for individual actors to 
shape educational discourses, although any emancipatory potential seems 
to be submerged by the language of accountability and efficiency that 
dominates education and the ideology of consumer choice of neo-liber-
alist politics that ‘facilitates a denial of the importance of structural disad-
vantage’ (Apple and Whitty 1999, p. 18).
According to Giroux (2004), critical rethinking of the role of schools 
and teachers requires that classrooms are viewed as sites of micropolitics in 
which those wider discourses are played out. This means that for Giroux 
the development of a radical form of pedagogy able to counteract the ero-
sion of democratic public life requires the reconciliation of the modernist 
ideal of an ethical and political discourse of emancipation in the exercise of 
critical reason with the postmodern focus on ‘the contingent and the spe-
cific’ (Giroux 2004, p. 66). From this perspective, moving from the differ-
ent ethical discourses that shape students’ experiences, educators can forge 
a relationship between the self and the other: ‘Ethics becomes a practice that 
broadly connotes one’s personal and social sense of responsibility to the Other’ 
(Giroux 2004, p. 67, capitalisation in the original).
the emancIPated Intercultural subject
The issue of emancipatory praxis represents a major concern in the critical 
intercultural approaches proposed by Holliday and Guilherme. However, 
adopting a post-structural feminist position it is possible to highlight an 
aspect that is particularly poignant in the context of intercultural educa-
tion, relating to the model of rationality employed in discourses of inter-
cultural critical awareness. As the union of the two words suggest- inter 
and cultural, the term intercultural implies dialogue across cultures. This 




the critical appreciation of cultural ideologies, the recognition of otheris-
ing practices and the possibility of reaching critical awareness regarding 
the reality of oppression and cultural domination (Holliday 2011). 
Nonetheless, the appreciation of cultural difference coupled with the idea 
of liberation from ideological falsifications presents a theoretical 
problem.
On the one hand, the rejection of grand narratives of totality in favour 
of the activation of differences (Lyotard 1991), presents the danger of 
turning intercultural communication praxis into a purely intellectual exer-
cise that eschews issues of hegemony in current discourses on culture and 
identity, and promoting a cultural relativism in which anything goes. This 
form of relativism has been described as ludic post-modernism (McLaren 
1995), a playful and depoliticised discourse that by emphasising difference 
is oblivious to the realities of power and inequality, in particular in refer-
ence to minority identities. On the other hand, the emancipatory agenda 
behind discourses of cultural hegemony and ideology runs the risk of rely-
ing on the vision of a final consensus that would follow once false con-
sciousness has been unmasked, a form of totality that glosses over the 
complexity and contradictory nature of the real in the illusory achieve-
ment of a transcendental truth that would finally win over other validity 
claims due to its own incontrovertible arguments. In regard to this conun-
drum, the feminist critical perspective on emancipation (Luke and Gore 
1992) problematizes the emancipatory ideal of critical pedagogy, in par-
ticular the identification of the Enlightenment equation of “knowing, 
naming and emancipation” (Lather 1992, p. 131) with the ideal of the 
historical role of a self-conscious human agency guided by the vanguard 
role of the critical intellectual. From this feminist position, the founda-
tional and unitary rational subject is rejected as a form of oppression of the 
other (Weedon 1987), a perspective which Ellsworth (1992) exemplifies 
in the paternalistic use of the word empowerment employed in critical 
pedagogy and the notion of the educator giving voice to her students.
Following Spivak (1988, 2004), discussing the issue of class and gender 
inequality adds complexity to the contraposition between dominant and 
peripheral cultures, or Centre and Periphery proposed by Holliday. 
According to Hall (1996) the idea of a Western society represents a his-
torical construct rather that a definite geographical reality. Hall argues that 
for a society to qualify as Western, it has to display specific characteristics- 
being developed, industrialized, urbanized, secular and modern. These 
features indicate an organization of knowledge in which perceived Western 
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and non-Western characteristics are distributed along a dichotomous axis: 
industrial-rural, developed-underdeveloped, secular-religious, modern- 
retrograde. Organized along these binary terms, non-Western societies 
become a counterpoint to the West, with a narrative that defines the West 
as a rational, chronologically linear, progressive entity and relegates non- 
Western societies to the role of the cultural other, dominated by irrational-
ity, historical immobility and religious fervour (Said 2003; Nair-Venugopal 
2012). Spivak (1988, 2004) describes Western cultural hegemony through 
the concept of epistemic violence, meaning the colonizing practice of cre-
ating an inferior other in the form of the colonial subject. However, for 
Spivak the reproduction of this dominant ideology does not proceed 
exclusively from the Centre to the Periphery, to use Holliday’s description 
of Western and non-Western realities, but it is produced by class and gen-
der stratifications within the Periphery itself. Particularly, Spivak refers to 
a transnational professional elite class involved in economic and human 
rights development in the context neo-colonialism, intended as an eco-
nomic enterprise of imperialism in the developing world,
There is no state on the globe today that is not part of the capitalist eco-
nomic system or can want to eschew it fully. (Spivak 2004, p. 84)
Therefore, according to this argument, the contraposition between Centre 
and Periphery is not only geographical, because the same distinction is 
present within the Periphery itself through the division between a privi-
leged transnational class and a subaltern class. Spivak describes the subal-
tern as “removed from lines of social mobility” (1988, p. 531). This term 
was employed by Gramsci (2007) to indicate Italian rural peasantry, and is 
extended by Spivak to include lower-class subaltern groups in colonial and 
post-colonial contexts. This means that, in contrast to the global 
 professional elite referred by Spivak, there exists a marginal class within the 
peripheral world, composed by subaltern groups. In this context, if subal-
tern groups are subjected to class inequality, subaltern women experience 
an additional form of oppression in the form of gender inequality (Spivak 
2004; Andreotti 2007), which can be extended to include oppression 
towards LGBT- lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender identities (Gray 
2013). Thus, the politics of class in the reproduction of cultural hege-
mony can be related to the divide between the global elite and the subal-
tern class employed by Spivak to the concept of space-time discussed in 




space-time can be shifted from Dervin’s idea of cultural identity as the 
ability to inhabit and negotiate a variety of space-times, opposed to rigid 
cultural identifications. Instead, the term can be employed to indicate class 
privilege in gaining access to technology that allows the flow of informa-
tion in real time without the limitations imposed by spatial distance. In 
this way, privilege is limited to those with the economic means to access 
the compression of time and space (Bauman 2000) that characterizes 
global late modernity, or post-modernity. Understood in these terms, the 
division between Centre and Periphery proposed by Holliday is defined 
not only by ideological constructs of culture, but is reproduced primarily 
through class inequality, in which gender inequality is also included. To 
this end, by pointing at class and gender stratifications within the Periphery 
and at the existence of an elite class that is transcultural, and thus intersect-
ing both Periphery and Centre, Spivak’s critical reading of colonial and 
postcolonial experiences of cultural domination and hegemony adds com-
plexity to Holliday’s contraposition between two irreconcilable cultural 
realities, one possessing a higher truth (the Periphery, non-Western) and 
the other expressing an ideological falsification (the Centre, Western). 
Moreover, following Spivak’s deconstruction of the type of rationality that 
informs the idea of giving voice to the other from an emancipatory per-
spective, unproblematized emancipatory practices are in danger of com-
mitting epistemic violence, which designates the naturalization of Western 
narratives of enlightenment, awareness, freedom and democracy, viewed 
as universal and ahistorical values (Chakrabarty 2000). Spivak (2004) 
describes this process of epistemic violence as the burden of the fittest, 
whereby Western constructs derived from specific historical processes are 
universalized and naturalized from a dominant position to become the 
means of liberation of the subaltern, cultural other. The idea of a burden 
of the fittest leads Spivak to contrast two forms of responsibility: 
 responsibility for the other- meaning that is the duty of the dominant posi-
tion, the fittest, to provide the means of enlightenment to the unprivi-
leged other; and responsibility to the other- intended as answerability and 
accountability (Andreotti 2007). This idea of ethics as direct engagement 
with the other is for Spivak a necessary precondition for initiating wider 
changes,
The necessary collective efforts are to change laws, relations of production, 
systems of education, and health care. But without the mind-changing one- 
on- one responsible contact, nothing will stick. (Spivak 2004, p. 383)
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Spivak’s critique of Western rationality as a naturalized dominant practice 
that intersects with the Periphery can be transposed to the idea of critical 
intercultural awareness, intended as a form emancipation from ideological 
falsifications able to readdress power imbalances. Here, it is suggested that 
the type of emancipatory praxis proposed in critical intercultural commu-
nication operates from the perspective of Hegelian dialectics (Hegel 
1956), as opposed to the idea of negative dialectics (Adorno 1973). 
Whereas the former is characterised by the attempt to inscribe reality in a 
totality, the latter refuses the concept of totality in favour of fragmentation 
and non-identity.
heGelIan dIalectIcs as a narratIve  
of PosItIve resolutIon
Hegelian dialectics is based on teleological finality, meaning that reality 
presents an intrinsic rationality that becomes increasingly evident through 
the unfolding of the Spirit (Geist- a higher form of consciousness of which 
individual consciousness is a limited manifestation) to self-realisation. This 
process leads to the reconciliation of differences and the resolution of all 
conflicts into a superior unity (Hegel 1956; deVries 1991). In Hegelian 
dialectics, the force behind the dialectic process is reason, which unfolds 
to reveal the rational substance of reality. This means that rational under-
standing resolves all the aporias of thought and achieves absolute know-
ing, once all contradictions have been resolved in the higher unity of the 
Spirit. In this way, the whole (or totality) is considered true, whilst the 
parts constituting the whole, which are deemed to be partial and incom-
plete in themselves, are subsumed in a totality through the dialectic pro-
cess. Although the triadic formula of thesis, antithesis and synthesis is 
considered to represent the principal element of the dialectical method, 
Hegel utilizes it only in Phenomenology of Spirit (1977) and in reference to 
Kant. However, Hegel adopts triadic expressions that involve the termi-
nology of affirmation, negation and negation of negation that are concep-
tually equivalent to the notions of thesis, antithesis and synthesis 
(Kaufmann 1988; Beiser 2005). In this context, for clarity of purpose the 
three stages of thesis, antithesis and synthesis are employed to illustrate 





The three stages begin with a concept, or thesis, through the negation 
or opposite, known as antithesis, and finally reaching a resolution in the 
synthesis, when contradictions and conflicts are solved in a higher totality. 
Thus, through self-examination, consciousness arrives at the rational com-
prehension of reality, making the world fully intelligible through the dia-
lectical movement (Stern 2002; Heidemann 2008). Discourses of critical 
awareness and emancipation create a dichotomy between a negative state 
prior to the acquisition of intercultural awareness, and a ‘real’ or ‘true’ 
state, in which conflicting claims are reconciled in the final unity of inter-
cultural consciousness. As in the teleological finality of Hegelian dialectics, 
the description of the development of critical intercultural awareness fol-
lows a similar dialectical pattern in which the critical speaker undergoes a 
process of transformation from a monocultural entity to an aware and 
emancipated intercultural speaker. Prior to the encounter with the other, 
the self is a monocultural entity, a state upset by being exposed to another 
cultural perspective, through language learning (e.g. Byram 2002) or 
international sojourning and educational exchanges (e.g. Jackson 2011). 
In these accounts of intercultural learning, the encounter with an unknown 
cultural perspective creates anxiety and culture shock, which can lead to 
miscommunication and negative stereotyping as described by Holliday 
(2011) and in Bennett’s (1993) triadic model of intercultural sensitivity, 
which progresses from the ethnocentric stages of denial, defence and min-
imization to the development of ethnorelativistic attitudes of acceptance, 
adaptation and integration. Table 2.3 illustrates the intercultural process 
of emancipation according to the triadic pattern. Guilherme (2002) adopts 
a similar triadic pattern, summarising the critical process in three main 
moments: the approach to a foreign culture, the engagement with the 
other culture and finally the performing of intercultural acts. As outcome 
of this experience, the self discovers the intrinsic and higher finality in 
which all the negative elements of the intermediate stage are transformed 
into tolerance, awareness and reflexivity, revealing the self as a critically 
aware intercultural speaker. In other words, this critical process of cultural 
awareness follows a pattern of positive resolution and presupposes the end 
of conflicting claims subsumed in a higher unity of understanding. This 
attribution of ontological existence to the intercultural self and its accom-
panying narratives of final resolution and harmony between conflicting 
positions can be contrasted with negative dialectics, an approach that fore-
grounds the concept of non-identity and non-totality.




Adorno and Horkheimer (2010) argue that the dialectics of Enlightenment 
turns the idea of reason into its opposite concept, the idea of myth, follow-
ing the Hegelian pattern of identity and non-identity, or thesis and antith-
esis. According to this internal dialectics, enlightenment reverts to 
mythology in the guise of positivist and instrumental reason producing 
totalitarism and mass alienation. However, if Hegelian dialectics presup-
poses the positive resolution of the negative moment, in negative dialec-
tics the two items remain separate, and continue to negate each other 
(Stone 2008). Adorno (1973) describes the dialectical process as an impo-
sition of unity on diversity, meaning that identity between thought and its 
object, or between reason and reality, is achieved negatively through a 
process of elimination of difference. Thus, negative dialectics renounces 
the imposition of unity and teleological finality of Hegelian dialectics, 
admitting the open ended and contingent character of the dialectical pro-
cess. Indeed, negative dialectics can be considered a dialectics of non- 
identity, which means that opposites are not resolved into a higher totality. 
Therefore, negative dialectics articulates “the divergence of concept and 
thing, subject and object, and their unreconciled state” (Adorno 2008), 
meaning that objects of knowledge cannot be entirely possessed by 
thought. From this perspective, negative dialectics engages with the prac-
tice of immanent critique, as opposed to transcendent critique. Whilst the 
latter establishes the principles of critique apriori before using them to 
criticize other theories from the outside, immanent critique exposes the 
internal contradictions of a theory or body of work, “remaining ‘within’ 
it” (Jarvis 1998, p. 6). Immanent critique does not resolve contradictions, 
abstracting a phenomenon from the totality to which it belongs, rather it 
examines relations within the totality of phenomena. The process of 
immanent critique proceeds through the arrangement of concepts into 
constellations, which means that an object of knowledge is connected to 
Table 2.3 Hegelian dialectics and intercultural consciousness
Thesis The self prior to the encounter with the other
Antithesis The encounter with the other causes culture shock and anxiety
The other as negation of the self
Synthesis Achievement of a higher totality: self and other are reconciled
The negative element is subsumed through a critical process of awareness 




others by examining the historical processes in which it is embedded and 
the past relations with other objects that have contributed to shape it in its 
individual uniqueness. Thus, understanding a concept entails weaving a 
narrative that gathers a plurality of other concepts that illuminate each 
other. However, being historically produced, objects of knowledge are 
never fully grasped because they are evolving and unfinished (Stone 2008). 
The unifying moment survives without a negation of negation, or an over-
coming of the negative by delivering itself to the abstraction of a supreme 
principle. It survives because there is no step-by-step progression from the 
concepts to a more general cover concept. Instead, the concepts enter a 
constellation. The constellation illuminates the specific side of the object, 
the side which to a classifying procedure is either a matter of indifference 
or a burden (Adorno 1973, p.  162). Not proceeding from concept to 
concept until a final reconciliation is found, the creation of constellations 
throws light on connections and aspects that have been previously ignored, 
reflecting the contingency and partiality of the objects being observed. In 
this way, dialectical thinking becomes fragmentary, renouncing the attempt 
to reconstruct a totality in the shape of a final concept that subsumes the 
others (Bowie 2013). Instead, it recognizes the historicity of an object of 
knowledge and examines it from the inside on its own terms. As Adorno 
explains,
The history locked in the object can only be delivered by a knowledge mind-
ful of the historic positional value of the object in its relation to other 
objects-by the actualization and concentration of something which is already 
known and is transformed by that knowledge. Cognition of the object in its 
constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object. (Adorno 1973, 
p. 163)
Similarly, intercultural communication can be the object of an immanent 
critique. Taking its existence as a specific object of knowledge, it is possible 
to question its ontological and epistemological assumptions: its stemming 
from a conception of autonomy of the individual and its positioning of 
communication as a process that can be determined in advance and fixed 
using the appropriate instruments. The following chapters will attempt to 
conduct an immanent critique of intercultural communication and, adopt-
ing the principle of non-identity of negative dialectics, this book will pos-
tulate interaction in terms of open-endedness, while eschewing the search 
for an ideal harmony and final erasure of all differences in the unity of 
intercultural understanding.




This chapter engages with the perspectivist view of interculturality of 
Jensen and Monceri, concluding that the idea of a hybrid, changing self 
does not explore sufficiently the issue of structural constraints that influ-
ence intercultural encounters, despite the acknowledgement of the exis-
tence of power relations between self and other. In addition to perspectivist 
interculturalism, this chapter discusses the notion of liquid interculturality 
proposed by Dervin, in which structure appears in the form of hegemonic 
cultural practices that essentialise individuals with the attribution of rigid 
cultural traits. Finally, the chapter explores the emancipatory intercultural 
frameworks of Holliday and Guilherme. Both recognise the existence of 
structural constraints, although they emphasise the independence of indi-
vidual action in uncovering hegemonic discourses and ideological falsifica-
tions. Regarding the notion of emancipation and intercultural awareness, 
the notion of the subaltern other and epistemic violence elaborated by 
Spivak (1988, 2004) highlights the Eurocentric bias in terms of epistemic 
violence in discourses of enlightenment and emancipation of the cultural 
other. Moreover, the contrast between Hegelian dialectics and Adorno’s 
negative dialectics opens the possibility of initiating an immanent approach 
to the critique of intercultural communication. The aim of such an imma-
nent critique would be to examine the internal contradictions that emerge 
from the interrogation of its presuppositions, and to map out its connec-
tions with other concepts, such as the autonomy of the ethical self in 
Kantian moral philosophy and the functionalism of current models of 
intercultural competence.
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Abstract This chapter provides an illustration of the ethics of Levinas and 
its relevance for intercultural communication. It discusses the notion of 
subjectivity as it is formulated by Levinas, which Derrida hospitality pro-
vides an account of the relationship between self and other that informs an 
ethical conception of intercultural dialogue in the form of presence to one 
another as corporeal, embodied subjects who co-construct meanings. This 
chapter delineates an alternative understanding of intercultural interaction 
that relies on a dialogic idea of communication closely connected to the 
experiential sphere and the bodily aspects of lived human subjectivity.
Keywords Tolerance and intercultural discourse • Hospitality • Intercultural 
ethics
IntroductIon1
The task facing the intercultural researcher who sets out to eschew essen-
tialism and simplified categorisation of the other is to conduct empirical 
research focusing on the ‘inter’ of intercultural interaction, with the inten-
tion of bringing to light the porous line between self and other, as well as 
the ability of the self to negotiate multiple cultural realities creatively. The 
acceptance of uncertainty in the form of responsible engagement with 
others in dialogue, represents an epistemological position that poses an 
ethical dilemma for the researcher: is the aim of dialogue a dialectical 
giuliana.ferri@uwl.ac.uk
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search for a final moment of reconciliation of differences, in which the 
other is framed within the confines of a universal ethics of tolerance? What 
happens if this dialogue is interrupted due to irreconcilable differences? 
Does intercultural dialogue take sufficient account of the possibility of 
violence, misunderstanding and refusal to engage with the other in the 
search for an idealised end of conflict in the luminous light of critical inter-
cultural awareness? Or, in other words, is intercultural communication 
rooted in a promise of understanding? This chapter will attempt to unravel 
this dilemma applying Derrida’s notion of the promise in order to examine 
critically the notion that knowledge and awareness of the other result in 
improved communication and harmonious interaction, and to identify the 
problematic consequences entailed in this simplified conceptualisation of 
human interaction.
The globalising tendencies of intercultural discourse result in the cre-
ation of a grand narrative (Lyotard 1984; Vandenabeele 2003) based on 
the universalised ideal of transparent and unambiguous information (Block 
and Cameron 2002) and on the ideas of tolerance and understanding 
from the hegemonic perspective of a dominant cultural position (Holliday 
2010, 2011) underpinning the idea of intercultural competence. This 
grand narrative based on the value of efficiency in communicating inter-
culturally appears in intercultural competence framework and intercultural 
training programs that focus on the acquisition of communicative skills to 
deal effectively with the other (Ferri 2016). Furthermore, the ideas of 
cooperation, dialogue and transformation that characterise emancipatory 
formulations of intercultural communication, outline the promise of a 
final moment of understanding that leads intercultural communication 
towards a universalistic notion of final reconciliation of differences. This 
last aspect in particular leaves unresolved the issue of contrasting claims in 
multicultural societies, leading to an aporia between theory and praxis 
(O’Regan and MacDonald 2007). According to this aporia, the promise 
of a final moment of understanding refers to the appeal to a transcendental 
signified, “an implied higher order of morality by which the differences that 
exist may be adjudicated and in some manner resolved” (MacDonald and 
O’Regan 2012, p.  4). This appeal to a higher order of morality leaves 
intercultural communication in a Kantian moral bind between universal 
claims to tolerance and the inability to provide “immanent—i.e. ‘here and 
now’ grounds for adjudicating between competing truth claims” (ibid., 
p. 6). Indeed, the use of the terms culture, cultural other, cultural differ-




understanding is highly problematic, as illustrated in the debate on multi-
culturalism between liberal theorists and cultural relativists, in particular 
the dichotomy between the existence of separated group identities and the 
universalism of traditional citizenship theory (Squires 2002). The liberal 
critique highlights the essentialist view of culture embodied in the multi-
cultural ideals of tolerance and respect of cultural difference that leaves 
unresolved the issue of individual freedom against cultural claims and 
group belonging, in other words the reconciliation between equality and 
difference (Barry 2001). In fact, the multicultural practice of ascribing 
cultural identities as a mark of difference generates a widespread fear of 
separateness that multicultural theorists address through the notion of 
integration intended in terms of a common form of citizenship (Taylor 
1994; Kelly 2002; Phillips 2007). Alternative perspectives attempt to 
move beyond both multicultural relativism and liberal abstract universal-
ism, arguing instead for a ‘pluralistically enlightened ethical universalism’ 
(Benhabib 2002, p. 36), which establishes a moral community committed 
to dialogical imperatives in the resolution of conflicts. This moral com-
munity is founded on the model of rational communicative ethics 
(Habermas 1984), in which equal protection under the law requires that 
individuals understand themselves as authors of the laws that bind society 
together through the creation of a public sphere (Critchley 2006; 
Outhwaite 2009). Similarly, Laclau proposes a relative universalization of 
values, meaning a universalism inscribed in a democratic dialogue between 
public spheres: “the particular can only fully realize itself if it constantly 
keeps open, and constantly redefines, its relation to the universal” (Laclau 
2007, p. 65). The debate against particularism in the name of universal 
values is relevant not only in academic contexts, but has been increasingly 
prominent in the media and in political discourse. An exemplar instance 
being the speech of British prime minister David Cameron attacking mul-
ticulturalism in 2011, which followed similar attacks by the German chan-
cellor Angela Merkel and the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy 
(Cameron: my war on multiculturalism, The Independent, 5th February 
2011), all pointing at the failure of multicultural policies to promote indi-
vidual freedom, fostering instead separateness and values that are irrecon-
cilable with life in modern Western liberal societies. This tendency towards 
the refusal of the other and the desire for a return to a more conservative 
era of national values has been evident in the movement behind Brexit, 
and in the victory of the anti-immigration rhetoric at the heart of Donald 
Trump’s victory in the US 2016 Presidential Elections. From this 
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perspective, the main issue at stake in the debate refers to the type of com-
munities that can be created and sustained in a pluralist society. Pluralism 
generates anxiety about the validity of universal perspectives and moral 
norms and, in this context, it is necessary to define a form of ethical under-
standing between people with different interpretations of the ‘common 
good’. The claims of the politics of recognition have highlighted the mis-
recognition of minority identities perpetrated by hegemonic discourses 
that promote their own partial worldview to the level of universal validity 
(Taylor 1994). However, Appiah (1994) warns against an unsophisticated 
understanding of collective identities that would replace the tyranny of 
hegemonic culture with the tyranny of a tightly scripted minority identity. 
Thus the dichotomy between the rights of the individual and the claims of 
collective identities represents an impasse that seems to characterise multi-
cultural societies, and it generates the need to define a model of ethical 
choice that could satisfy the demands of universalism while simultaneously 
showing respect for particularism and individual autonomy. In the context 
of intercultural communication research, a more nuanced account of oth-
erness is necessary in order to problematize the role of cultural difference 
in shaping the categories of self and other and complement both Laclau’s 
and Benhabib’s idea of a moral community, balancing the claims of both 
universalism and relativism.
the PromIse as deferred understandIng
Derrida (1974, 1984, 1997) defines the tendency to fulfilment and com-
pleteness in Western philosophical thinking in terms of a ‘metaphysics of 
presence’, relating this disposition to the idea of promise. According to 
this metaphysics of presence, Western metaphysical tradition encloses 
truth within a system of binary oppositions which refer to an original sig-
nified. In this system of binary oppositions one term is identified with full 
presence -or truth, and the other term, the negative, with the loss of pres-
ence (Norris 1982; Derrida 1997; Bradley 2008). This metaphysics of 
presence is reflected in the opposition between tolerance and intolerance: 
on the one side, the positive value of tolerance of the other, promoted by 
intercultural understanding; on the other, the opposed and the negative 
value of intolerance and refusal of the other and of the cultural practices 
attributed to the other (MacDonald and O’Regan 2012, p. 4). However, 
this dichotomy is unable to provide immanent reasons to resolve the con-
flicting claims of those who advocate tolerance and those who refuse it 




divisive arguments across ethnic, linguistic, cultural and historical lines, an 
example being the terroristic acts of the Norwegian white supremacist, 
Anders Behring Breivik, the Wisconsin Sikh Temple shootings in 2012 
carried out by another white supremacist, Wade Michael Page, the murder 
of Dr George Tiller by anti-abortion terrorist Scott Roeder in 2009, the 
terrorist attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo by Saïd and Chérif 
Kouachi in 2015, or the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and in London 
in 2017, first in London Bridge and subsequently against Muslims outside 
a mosque in Finsbury Park. In these cases, the underlying concept refers 
to a ‘metaphysics of presence’ and the notion of a final moment in which 
competing claims will be resolved by defeating the ‘false’ or ‘negative’ 
opponent.
The idea of promise as deferred understanding recurs throughout 
Derrida’s philosophical investigations and it is described in the notion of a 
‘disjointed’ temporality that is irreducible to presence (Derrida 1994; 
Wortham 2010), meaning that there is an element that remains irreduc-
ible to the system of binary oppositions of Western metaphysics, which is 
the experience of an emancipatory promise described in terms of a mes-
sianism without religion. This notion of messianism is connected to the 
idea of justice in terms of a ‘democracy to come’ (Derrida 1994, p. 74). 
According to the principle of disjointed temporality of this messianism 
without religion, the notion of a democracy to come does not represent 
an ideal future democracy, which is opposed to imperfect existing political 
systems. Instead, it embodies the irreducible element that eludes the sys-
tem of oppositions established in the metaphysics of presence. This irre-
ducible element is described in terms of a gap between “fact and ideal 
essence” (Derrida 1994, p. 80), or between the reality of existing political 
systems and the utopian ideal of a future democracy. Furthermore, this 
notion applies not only to existing forms of imperfect democracy, but 
according to Derrida it constitutes the apriori structure of the essence of 
justice itself. According to this form of messianism without religion, 
democracy is
a concept of a promise that can only arise in such a diastema (failure, inad-
equation, disjunction, disadjustment, being ‘out of joint’). That is why we 
always propose to speak of a future democracy in the future present, not 
even of a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or of a utopia- at least to the 
extent that their inaccessibility would still retain the temporal form of a 
future present, and of a future modality of the living present. (Derrida 1994, 
p. 81)
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This means that the ideas of democracy and justice cannot be established 
as full presence in a present or in a future time, because that would imply 
a return to the metaphysical binary opposition between a positive term 
that reflects truth and a term that negates this ideal. The idea of a democ-
racy to come is described as an ‘experience of the impossible’ and a ‘messianic 
opening to what is coming’ (Derrida 1994, p. 82), defining ethics in terms 
of infinite responsibility and hospitality without reserve. In this interpreta-
tion, the promise stops being such when it is fulfilled, and thus in order to 
retain its messianic character it has to remain open: “It is performative in 
as much as it entails a pledge, an affirmation or giving that is not simply 
identical or exhausted by its specific content” (Wortham 2010, p. 146). In 
other words, the promise does not produce the event of which it speaks 
(Derrida 2001), maintaining the character of an unfulfilled promise that is 
constantly renewed in the tension between the act and its realisation. This 
tension is experienced in the aporia between existing political institutions 
operating within the framework of Western democratic liberalism, based 
on the notion of the nation-state, and the infinite ethical demand of 
unconditional hospitality that overflows the boundaries delimited by 
nation-states, and constitutes the regulating aspect of ethical responsibil-
ity. In an interview with Borradori, Derrida explains that:
We are always led back to the same aporia: how to decide between, on the 
one hand, the positive and salutary role played by the “state” form (the 
sovereignty of the nation-state) and, thus, by democratic citizenship in pro-
viding protection against certain kinds of international violence (the market, 
the concentration of world capital, as well as “terrorist” violence and the 
proliferation of weapons) and, on the other hand, the negative or limiting 
effects of a state whose sovereignty remains a theological legacy, a state that 
closes its borders to noncitizens, monopolises violence, controls its borders, 
excludes or represses noncitizens, and so forth? (Borradori 2003, p. 126)
Derrida’s definition of the idea of tolerance, understood in terms of ‘con-
descending concession’, and ‘a form of charity’ (p. 127), contrasts with the 
idea of unconditional hospitality. In particular, Derrida’s notion of hostip-
itality (2006) exposes the inherent contradiction of tolerance through the 
analysis of the word hospitality. In Derrida’s deconstruction, the words 
hospitality and hostility carry the binary oppositions friend/enemy, hospi-




stranger treated as friend or ally, and the stranger treated with hostility as 
an enemy (Derrida 2006, p. 210). According to this reading of the word, 
because the welcome conferred upon a guest is dependent on the goodwill 
of the host, that same welcome can be withdrawn, turning into hostility, if 
the rules of the household are not observed. Therefore, the exercise of 
tolerance is dependent on a conditional welcome, and this welcome can be 
withdrawn to exclude the other at any time. On the one hand, uncondi-
tional hospitality represents an impossible ideal, on the other, it provides 
an idea of perfectibility guiding the rules governing conditional hospital-
ity. This idea of perfectibility exposes Derrida’s reluctance to enclose the 
practice of dialogue and the exercise of political deliberation within a 
totalising dimension that would lead to closure. An example of closure 
and of totalising tendencies in dialogue can be illustrated by the debates 
regarding universalism and particularism in multicultural societies, which 
are framed in dichotomous terms between tolerance of the cultural prac-
tices of the other and equality. In this sense, the notion of a democracy to 
come complements the necessity to reach a form of rational consensus 
implicit in the model of discursive democracy (Habermas 1984) but leav-
ing open the possibility for further dialogue. Matust̂ík (2006, p.  280) 
describes this idea of perfectibility inherent in democracy itself in terms of 
an “exiled otherness” that reminds participants in a community of commu-
nication of the perils of the search for a totalising closure to the detriment 
of engagement in open ended dialogue. Assuming perfectibility as a char-
acteristic of engagement in dialogue, Derrida’s deconstruction of the 
word hospitality resonates with the distinction proposed here in relation 
to intercultural communication between two forms of a promise of under-
standing, one intended in terms of final reconciliation and universal toler-
ance, and the other in terms of deferred understanding. This distinction 
addresses the problematic nature of the notion of tolerance of cultural 
practices employed in intercultural communication, which leaves the con-
ceptualisation of the relationship self/other open to this internal contra-
diction highlighted by Derrida. In other words, tolerance generates an 
internal aporia between the acceptance of the cultural other as different, 
and the claim of a universal resolution of those same differences in a final 
ideal of unity (MacDonald and O’Regan 2012). This aporia can be traced 
to Kantian ethics and its ideal of a universality of reason.
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KantIan autonomy and the LevInasIan other
Kantian ethics emerged in the context of the Enlightenment, with the 
attempt to define the separate domains of reason and religious obedience. 
In other words, the notion of morality as obedience to religious precepts 
was contested in the name of the human ability to direct actions conform-
ing to the dictates of reason. Kant is responsible for the formulation of the 
conception of morality as autonomy and the subsequent redefinition of 
the relationship between individuals and society in terms of self- governance 
of the individual, guiding the change towards the establishment of Western 
liberal societies (Atwell 1986; Schneewind 1998). Kant (1979) divides 
philosophy into theoretical and practical, the first concerning knowledge 
and the other concerning the conduct of beings possessed of free will. In 
the latter application of philosophical reflection, ethics is a “theory of vir-
tue” that studies the “intrinsic quality of actions” (p.  71) meaning to 
determine whether an action is not simply the result of compliance with 
the law, but of the correct moral disposition, in terms of strength in self- 
control and self-mastery. This correct moral disposition obeys the categor-
ical imperatives guiding practical reason, and determines the free will and 
autonomy of all rational beings (Kant 2004). A crucial aspect of Kantian 
autonomy is that, as part of the noumenal realm (i.e. the realm of the 
thing-in-itself, unknowable to human experience), freedom is intended in 
transcendental terms: moral action is not the result of natural causation, 
but follows instead the categorical imperative, a categorical obligation not 
influenced by the pull of desires and interferences from the sensible world. 
Here resides the core of Kantian orthodoxy (Johnson 2007), the fact that 
authority originates in our individual reason, so we act freely only when we 
reject sensory interferences and place our actions under the scrutiny of a 
universal law. In fact, moral agents act either in heteronomous terms 
(Homo Phaenomenon), meaning that the moral law generates from the 
phenomenal world, or as autonomous agents according to the noumenal 
world (Homo Noumenon), when the action originates in the self- 
determining, rational and autonomous individual (Atwell 1986). Thus, 
ethics is a theory of virtue and a philosophy of action based on the strength 
of self-mastery in respect to the moral disposition, and it “provides rules for 
the proper use of our freedom, irrespective of particular applications of it” 
(Kant 1979, p. 2). The moral imperative corresponds to three separate 





Bonitas problematica when the action is determined by the achieve-
ment of an end.
Bonitas pragmatica the action is determined by prudence and as 
means to happiness.
Bonitas moralis the action is determined by the goodness of an 
action in and for itself, representing a free act, 
determined only by the strength of reason and by 
its universal validity. (Kant 1979)
The influence of Kantian ethics has been most evident in the development 
of the concept of autonomy in moral philosophy. The idea of autonomy is 
characterised by an internal tension between the two words ‘auto’ and 
‘nomos’, meaning respectively the will of a rational being, and the law 
objectively binding on that same will (Wood 2008). According to Kant in 
Metaphysics of Morals (1983), the ‘nomos’ is grounded on objective rea-
sons valid for all rational beings who recognise the principles of the law as 
universally valid and objectively binding. According to the concept of 
autonomy, rational beings must be viewed under the two attributes of 
Homo Noumenon, the intelligible self imposing the duty of respect to the 
law, and Homo Phaenomenon, the empirical self who is subject to the law. 
This split self is regulated conscience, which Kant describes as an internal 
court presiding over the self. According to the modalities of this internal 
court, which operates under the faculty of judgement, the self is at the 
same time the accuser and the accused:
Every man has a conscience and finds himself observed by an internal judge, 
who threatens him and keeps him in awe (respect combined with fear). This 
authority watching over the laws within him is not something which he 
himself (arbitrarily) creates, but is incorporated in his being. If he tries to 
run away, his conscience follows him like a shadow. (Kant 1983, p. 101)
From this description of the internal judge presiding over the free, self- 
determining moral being in the form of the Homo Noumenon, in 
 contrast to the heteronomy of the Homo Phaenomenon, whose conduct 
is generated by stimuli coming from the sensible world, it is clear that the 
notion of autonomy represents the pivotal feature of Kant’s entire moral 
philosophy (Atwell 1986). Recent interest in autonomy emphasises an 
individualistic interpretation of the concept. This focus on individualism 
begins in the 1970s (see Neely 1974; Norris 1982; Dworkin 1988; 
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Frankfurt 1988), with the development of hierarchical accounts of per-
sonal autonomy in which the content of the moral law is considered neu-
tral, and autonomy depends on the ability to endorse or repudiate desires 
that move individuals to action (Taylor 2005). More recently, the con-
cept of autonomy has acquired relevance in the context of the relation-
ship between agency (the capacity for intentional actions), and liberty 
(independence from controlling influences), in reference to applied ethics 
and the notion of accountability of morally responsible agency (Arpaly 
2005; Beauchamp 2005; Haji 2005). However, the aspect most relevant 
in the context of this research is that concerning the debate between a 
liberal conception of individual autonomy (Rawls 1999; Barry 2001) and 
multicultural claims to group identity, particularly Taylor’s (1994) poli-
tics of recognition and the formulation of a multiculturalism framed 
within liberal- democratic values (Appiah 2005; Kymlicka 2007). The rel-
evance of Kantian ethics in this debate resides in the historical context in 
which the concept autonomy of the individual was originally elaborated, 
guiding social change from pre-Enlightenment morality to modern lib-
eral societies, and subsequently entering in conflict with claims of group 
recognition in multiculturalism. In conclusion, the most significant aspect 
of Kantian autonomy is that the self is able to act responsibly, becoming 
accountable for his/her own actions, only as an autonomous and self-
regulating rational being, the Homo Noumenon. Adorno and Horkheimer 
in the Frankfurt School (2010) began the systematic critique of the idea 
of reason inherited from the Enlightenment, and the associated notion of 
a transcendental subject and instrumental reason. The Enlightenment 
project was revalued by Habermas (1987), who revalued reason in rela-
tion to its various social and embodied incarnations. This situated nature 
of reason is particularly evident, according to Habermas, in everyday 
communicative practices underpinned by a drive to mutual understand-
ing. The post-modern turn is associated with a critique of reason in favour 
of ‘the other’, meaning the excluded from uniformity and from the self- 
transparency of the transcendental subject (Poster 1989; Lyotard 1984, 
1988; Honneth 1995; Derrida 2001). In post-modern ethics, the notion 
of asymmetrical obligation introduces a reversal of the Kantian perspec-
tive of equal treatment and autonomy underpinned by the categorical 
imperative.
Levinas’s notion of the asymmetrical relation with the other signifies 




code of conduct of the moral imperative, and ethics, or the encounter with 
the other person in her embodied corporality.
Ethics: a comportment in which the other, who is strange and indifferent to 
you, who belongs neither to the order of your interest nor to your affec-
tions, at the same time matters to you. A relation of another order than that 
of knowledge, in which the object is given value by knowing it, which passes 
for the only relations with beings. Can one be for an I without being reduced 
to an object of pure knowledge? Placed in an ethical relation, the other man 
remains other. (Levinas 2001, p. 48)
Levinas displaces the traditional language of metaphysics and operates a 
semantic transformation of its terminology. In the history of metaphysical 
inquiry the principal preoccupation has been the rational apprehension of 
reality through concepts such as being, universals or first causes and the 
definition of the unchanging elements that constitute the essence of mor-
als or free will. Levinas dispenses with these preoccupations regarding 
ontology and defines ethics in terms of responsibility to the singular other 
through a radical move from the Kantian ideal of autonomy to the notion 
of passivity of the self exposed to the other. This displacement of the tra-
ditional concerns of metaphysical thought translates into a movement of 
positive desire towards alterity- the ‘otherness’ of the other (Critchley 
1999; Derrida 2010). In this regard, Levinasian ethics represents a rever-
sal of the tradition of the cogito- the I think of Descartes. Levinas describes 
the solitude of the self in its ontological state, as riveted to the materiality 
of the body and subject to its needs and demands. Only the ethical rela-
tion awakens the self from this state, when it is exposed to the other. The 
crucial difference with Kantian ethics arises at this point, in the determina-
tion of the motivation to act according to ethical principles. In the Kantian 
tradition of autonomy, the ethical act stems from an abstract moral imper-
ative to which the self abides in accordance to the dictates of transcenden-
tal reason. In heteronomous Levinasian terms, however, the ethical act 
originates from the other, from the ethical demand that the other imposes 
upon me. In this sense, the human acquires its significance only in relation 
to the other, and not prior to that, when the self is singled out by the other 
who imposes an ethical demand. This theme of ethical responsibility origi-
nates from the immanent here and now, which is conceptualised in a series 
of oppositions: accusativity vs subjectivity; asymmetry vs symmetry; heter-
onomy vs autonomy and proximity vs distance.




The self experiences and relates to the world according to two modalities, 
an ontological relation and an ethical relation (Levinas 2006b). In the first 
instance, subjectivity organises experience through knowledge, according 
to the transcendental apperception of the Cogito or of the Kantian I think. 
Thus, on the one side, subjectivity opens to the world as intentionality of 
consciousness, through knowledge. On the other, the self experiences the 
world in a modality that is not related to ontological knowledge (the 
knowledge of being), but is elicited by the existential and corporeal dis-
covery of vulnerability. This experience of the self opening to the world as 
an embodied being represents a traumatic experience, which is likened to 
a “stripping of the skin exposed to wound and outrage” (Levinas 2006b, 
p. 63). This state is brought about by the experience of sensibility, lived 
first in terms of enjoyment and then in what Levinas defines in terms of 
‘exposedness to the other’ (1998, p. 75). This means that, if enjoyment rep-
resents the culmination of the ego, the ‘singularisation of the ego in its 
coiling back upon itself’ (p. 73), the encounter with the other is lived as an 
experience that exceeds the categories of representation and apperception 
of the rational mind, and that is likened to the experience of a trauma. In 
this mode, the self becomes the locus of an encounter with the other. 
Here, subjectivity is lived in a modality that is defined as ‘accusativity’, 
meaning that it is the other who calls the self to action:
At least no escape is possible with impunity. The other calls upon that sensi-
bility with a vocation that wounds, calls upon an irrevocable responsibility, 
and thus the very identity of a subject. (Levinas 1998, p. 77)
This notion of subjectivity lived in the modality of accusativity, is not 
reducible to the categories of the mind, because it pertains to the sphere 
of the corporeal and of embodiment. In Levinas’s words, the experience 
of meeting the other in this modality is ‘independent of the adventure of 
cognition’ because in this instance the ‘corporeality of the subject is not sepa-
rable from its subjectivity’ (p. 78). Thus, accusativity represents the ethical 
subject as ‘flesh and blood’, whereas rational subjectivity is identified with 
the abstract ‘I think’, the cogito, separated from the body. This opposing 
relationship is reflected in the encounter with the other, depending on 
whether the encounter happens in the modality of the cogito or in that of 




the known, or the categories of the same and of identity in Levinasian 
terms, operating autonomously and according to abstract principles. As 
accusativity, however, the relation with the other is invested with 
responsibility.
In the context of intercultural communication, the notion of the face of 
the other emphasises the materiality of the embodied other facing the self 
(Sparrow 2013), which is expressed in communication through the 
notions of the saying and the said, meaning respectively the event of 
speech and the content of speech. As an illustration of this reading of the 
face of the other, in the following quote Levinas explains that, as opposed 
to ontological knowledge of the other, the ethical relation is established in 
the presence of self and other in their materiality, as embodied beings,
I do not know if one can speak of a ‘phenomenology’ of the face, since phe-
nomenology describes what appears. So, too, I wonder if one can speak of a 
look turned toward the face, for the look is knowledge, perception. I think 
rather that access to the face is straightaway ethical. You turn yourself toward 
the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, forehead, a chin, 
and you can describe them. The best way of encountering the Other is not 
even to notice the colour of his eyes! When one observes the colour of the 
eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other. The relation with the 
face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face 
is what cannot be reduced to that. (Levinas 1985, pp. 85–86)
Understood in this way, ‘the whole human body is in this sense more or less 
face’ (Levinas 1985, p. 99). The notion of the face of the other illustrates 
the difference between Kantian autonomy and Levinasian heteronomy. 
Furthermore, in the context of intercultural communication an under-
standing of the role of the other in shaping interaction is a crucial deter-
minant in the task of redefining an idea of ethical responsibility that is 
based on the interdependence of self and other, and that emphasises the 
inter-of the intercultural, meaning its processual and embodied aspects. 
From this perspective, the notion of the face conveys the ethical effect of 
an encounter in which embodiment and corporeality reveal mortality and 
the vulnerability of existence, designating the other in his/her corporeality 
and indicating the proximity of the other person facing the self. Thus, 
obligation towards the other is not the result of a formal or procedural 
universalization of maxims, because ethics is lived in the corporeal obliga-
tion that originates from the immanent, here and now, meeting with the 
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other (Critchley 1999). In the presence of another being we are com-
pelled to respond, although in relation to the phrase ‘straightaway ethical’ 
it does not imply necessarily a conception of ‘goodness’ as it is commonly 
used in reference to a moral judgment, rather it expresses the practical 
engagement established with an other in the praxis of everydayness and 
communication, which also harbours the possibility of hostility, fear, vio-
lence and even murderous intention. Indeed, Levinas articulates an ethical 
ambivalence inherent in the encounter with the other that includes the 
possibility of violence, “a desire to kill, an ethical necessity not to kill” 
(Butler 2010, p. 173). For Levinas this desire to kill, this violence, repre-
sents a modality of engagement in which the self dominates the other, 
encountered in the vulnerability of embodiment, as face. It is precisely this 
murderous impulse that defines the ethical dimension of alterity, since the 
face of the other poses the ethical challenge of resisting violence (“the 
Other is the only being I can wish to kill”, Levinas 1969, p. 198). According 
to Levinas (1985), an expression of this ethical ambivalence is found in the 
biblical moral imperative Thou shalt not kill: on the one side, because of its 
vulnerability, the face can generate a murderous impulse, on the other the 
face reminds the self of the interdiction to kill. In this sense, ethical engage-
ment assumes a different connotation due to the acknowledgment of the 
possibility of miscommunication, misunderstanding and failure to estab-
lish dialogue, which is entailed in a conception of intercultural communi-
cation that recognises the dimension of risk taking and open ended 
engagement between self and other and, indeed, to recall Phipps, the fact 
that there are no ‘quick fixes’ to the endeavour of human understanding.
In this regard, the notion of sensibility, indicating the corporeal aspect 
of subjectivity from which the self encounters the other (Levinas 2008) 
replaces the notions of awareness and sensitivity that are commonly used 
in intercultural communication. Intercultural awareness describes a pro-
cess of enlightenment that allows the self to uncover a higher truth that 
resolves all conflicting claims in the name of universal tolerance of the 
cultural other. Similarly, intercultural sensitivity indicates the ability to dis-
criminate levels of cultural difference in order to interact effectively with 
others. Through the six stages of development of intercultural sensitivity- 
denial, defense reversal, minimization, acceptance, adaptation and integra-
tion (Bennett 1993), the individual becomes progressively accustomed to 
cultural difference, thus adjusting his/her perceptions and experiencing a 
reduction of uncertainty (Wiseman 2003; Hammer et  al. 2003). Both 




delineated in reference to Kant, and depend on the idea of cultural differ-
ence as the principal obstacle to clear and unambiguous communication. 
With the notion of sensibility, Levinasian ethics suggests an alternative 
conceptualisation of the relation with the other, based on the perception 
of the embodied self in the ethical encounter. Whereas awareness and sen-
sitivity develop in the ontological dimension of the self, sensibility repre-
sents the bodily aspect of experience and indicates a pre-reflective 
engagement with the other, meaning being affected by the presence of 
another. In this sense, the self as a sentient being is affected by the pres-
ence of the embodied other. This fact creates the preconditions for the 
development of an ethical concern for the other stemming from the ‘here 
and now’, meaning the immediacy of lived experience. The ethical, in 
other words, is embedded in the materiality with which the self is engaged 
in everyday existence,
We live from ‘good soup’, air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc…
These are not objects of representations. We live from them. (Levinas 2008, 
p. 110)
Taking this materiality in consideration, it is important to highlight how 
this understanding of the ethical does not necessarily entail that engage-
ment with the other is devoid of difficulties. On the contrary, it implies a 
traumatic element of discovery of the self as a sentient being who is faced 
with the ethical choice to respond to the presence of an other. This 
response, however, can assume the aspect of refusal of engagement, of fear 
or of misunderstanding. The crucial aspect is that this material presence of 
the other will pose ethical demands and ethical challenges, which the self 
is called to acknowledge.
asymmetry vs. symmetry
In the ethical relation described by Levinas (1985, 1998), the relation to 
the other lived as pure exteriority and obligation is devoid of any form of 
intentionality, for the self previously enclosed in the solitude of egoism 
and self-preservation is exposed to the other in an asymmetrical relation. 
Therefore, the self does not absorb and determine the meaning of the 
other, because the other escapes the play of the same, or the dialectic pro-
cess through which the self reaffirms its own identity after representing 
and enveloping the other into a theme, or categories of knowledge, 
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recreating a totality. Although ontological thinking predominates in the 
tradition of Western philosophy, Levinas finds in the ethical relation with 
the other an originary form of thinking that ‘overflows the capacity of 
thought’ (1969, p.  49), adopting the idea of infinity that Descartes 
described in the Third Meditation. The argument of that meditation, 
aimed at establishing the existence of god by the fact that the idea of the 
infinite cannot have been generated by a finite being, is turned by Levinas 
to designate the encounter with the other in the form of irreducible alter-
ity, “the relation with a being that maintains its total exteriority to him who 
thinks it” (1969, p. 50). Thus, the ethical relation assumes the character of 
responsibility when the self abdicates her/his sovereignty as thinking sub-
ject and answers to the other, meaning entering in a relation in which the 
self is not the master. In order to illustrate this asymmetrical relation, ethi-
cal responsibility is defined as a state of ‘insomnia or wakefulness’, a ‘per-
petual state of vigilance and effort which can never slumber’ (Levinas 1969, 
p. 66) rather than an act proceeding from a fully bounded, rational, auton-
omous self. This state of vigilance described by Levinas is reminiscent of 
the messianism without religion of Derrida (1994) and the materialistic 
messianism of Benjamin (1999), in which the anticipation of an eschato-
logical finality of messianic religions is abandoned in favour of a concep-
tion of temporality that contracts time in the here and now, in the 
immediacy of contact with the other. In the ethical relation described by 
Levinas, the self is not in control of the interaction, rather the interaction 
proceeds in an open- ended and unpredictable manner.
heteronomy vs. autonomy
In contrast to the idea of autonomy, the concept of heteronomy places 
subjectivity outside of the disembodied realm of the Cartesian ego into 
the phenomenal world, where it interacts with other selves to become an 
ethical being. In this context, ethical choices are made in relation to oth-
ers, and not prior to the intersubjective relation. Thus, in contrast to the 
concept of autonomy, heteronomy indicates the central idea in Levinasian 
ethics that the self is not self-legislating, but is determined by the call of 
the other. In other words, the self acquires meaning through the intersub-
jective relations established with other selves, rather than through abstract 
notions related to transcendental conceptions of subjectivity. The principal 
issue in the opposition between the two concepts of heteronomy and 
autonomy is to establish whether ethical actions are determined by abstract 




This means that the self is either a product of moral norms that belong to 
it transcendentally and that pre-exist its constitution as a subject, or that 
the self becomes an ethical being only in relation to others. In this last 
sense, the attention towards the immanent and the contingent that is 
behind the notion of the heteronomy of the self, leaves open the question 
of establishing a ground for moral accountability and moral agency that is 
universal and not tied to the particular (Butler 2005). The answer pro-
vided by Levinasian ethics is that the self acquires ethical significance only 
in relation to the other; prior to that the self exists in an ontological sense, 
as a being concerned primarily with its own perseverance in being, or 
conatus essendi. The ethical, in this context, originates outside of ontology 
and is otherwise than being (Levinas 1998). All questions relating to the 
social and the political, in short the aforementioned problem of universal-
ism vs particularism, stem from the original relation to alterity, meaning 
the otherness of the other, that interrupts the solitude of the self and the 
disembodied, abstract I think.
This difference can be further illustrated in reference to the use of the 
term intercultural in intercultural communication. The contrast between 
heteronomy and autonomy becomes evident whether the emphasis is 
placed on the ‘inter’ or on the ‘cultural’: when the emphasis is placed on 
the ‘inter’, meaning processuality, interaction cannot be determined in 
advance, because it represents the result of the process itself, which is 
always in the immanent here and now. In the second instance, the focus on 
culture means that communication can be guided through the acquisition 
of competences, which determine the outcome of interaction. In this 
sense, the first relation is ethical, relational, open ended and heterono-
mous, whereas the second relation is ontological, autonomous and guided 
by the necessity of the self to determine outcomes through the use of 
cultural categorisation of the other. The metaphysics of presence mani-
fested in the opposition between tolerance and intolerance appears in this 
conception of the self as the autonomous and self-governing individual of 
the Western liberal tradition. It is this autonomous self who exercises tol-
erance in welcoming the other conditionally, while retaining the right to 
withdraw the welcome accorded to the other. The conception of tolerance 
envisioned from the perspective of the autonomous self excludes the role 
of the other in interaction, positing subjectivity as independent from the 
influence of the external world. This reliance on the idea of tolerance 
leaves intercultural communication in an ethical conundrum in relation to 
the ability to engage dialogically with differing cultural and ethical frame-
works. The complexity of intercultural communication surfaces when the 
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ideals of autonomy and self-sufficiency of the self are destabilised by the 
material and embodied presence of the other. In this situation, under-
standing is deferred in the praxis of engagement between self and other. In 
this sense, the practice of deferred understanding addresses this conflict 
inherent in the notion of hostipitality between tolerance and intolerance.
ProxImIty vs. dIstance
Levinas subverts the traditional correlation between knowledge and being, 
dispossessing the ego of its privileged position as res cogitans, a thing that 
thinks. In his interpretation, knowledge appropriates and grasps other-
ness, reducing it to sameness through the act of transcendental appercep-
tion. He writes: ‘Knowledge as perception, concept, comprehension, refers 
back to an act of grasping’ (in Kearney and Rainwater 1996, p. 124). In 
this activity of appropriation of the known and reduction of alterity to 
sameness, the ego lives in the solitude of a ‘happy conscience’, disinter-
ested and self-sufficient in its solipsism, leading to
full self-consciousness affirming itself as absolute being, and confirming 
itself as an I that, through all possible ‘differences’, is identified as master of 
its own nature as well as of the universe and able to illuminate the darkest 
recesses of resistance to its powers. (Levinas 1996, p. 127)
However, next to the transcendental ego of pure consciousness, Levinas 
distinguishes a non-intentional consciousness, or pre-intentional con-
sciousness, which he describes using the words ‘stranger’, ‘countryless’ and 
‘homeless’ (p. 129) to indicate a dimension of the self that does not reside 
under the bright light of intentional consciousness. In this realm of pre- 
intentional consciousness, ethics begins with the appearance of the face, in 
relation to otherness, which opens the possibility of conceiving a ‘freedom 
exterior to one’s own’ (Levinas 2006a, p. 14). This ego stripped of its tran-
scendental sovereignty is defined by Levinas (1996) as mauvaise conscience, 
i.e. bad conscience, when the self discovers the guilt of the affirming sub-
ject and the need to answer for its right to be. This experience introduces 
the idea of responsibility and justice:
The human is the return to the interiority of nonintentional consciousness, 
to bad conscience, to its possibility of fearing injustice more than death, of 
preferring injustice undergone to injustice committed, and what justifies 




This means that the encounter with the other generates the fear of vio-
lence and usurpation that the individual risks committing in his/her striv-
ing for self-preservation. Thus, the notion of proximity describes the 
conception of sociality that underpins the idea of the other, where proxim-
ity represents the modality that confers an ethical, and therefore ‘human’, 
status to the self. Once the basic relationship self-other has been estab-
lished as the origin of the ethical mode of existence, Levinas introduces 
the notion of the third person, which enters and mediates the relationship 
between the individual and the other:
But we are never, me and the other, alone in the world. There is always a 
third: the men who surround me. And this third is also my neighbour. Who 
is the nearest to me? Inevitable question of justice which arises from the 
depth of responsibility for the unique, in which ethics begins in the face of 
that which is incomparable. Here is the necessity of comparing what is 
incomparable- of knowing men. First violence, violence of judgment, trans-
formation of faces into objective and plastic forms, into figures which are 
visible but de-faced; the appearing of men: of individuals, who are certainly 
unique, but restituted to their genera. (Levinas 2001, pp. 115–116)
The entrance of this third person signifies the institution of laws and polit-
ical systems that guarantee the rights of each individual, effacing the dyadic 
relation self-other. In this sense, the relationship between self and the 
other undergoes a transformation with the appearance of this third person, 
because the ethical relationship becomes political in the need to reconcile 
conflicting claims (Kearney 1984; Levinas 2006b). To this end, ethics 
‘hardens its skin’ (Kearney 1984, p. 65) upon entering the political world 
of this impersonal third. Nevertheless, the ethical vocation of the self does 
not disappear in the formalisation of justice into a legal system, because 
‘justice only has meaning if it retains the spirit of dis-interestedness which 
animates the idea of responsibility for the other man’ (Levinas 1985, p. 99). 
Consequently, a political order can be challenged in the name of this ethi-
cal responsibility towards the other. This introduction of symmetry in the 
relation with others through the notion of the third person becomes poi-
gnant in order to fully understand the concrete implications of ethical 
responsibility. The notion of individual responsibility should not be mis-
taken with a naïve negation of institutions and the state in favour of a form 
of voluntarism that relies on the goodwill of individuals. In fact, Levinas 
affirms the necessity to live in a world of citizens and not only in ‘the order 
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of the Face to Face’ (Levinas 2006a, p. 90), but it is essential to highlight 
the fact that individuals cannot abdicate entirely to the State their own 
duties of responsibility towards the other. In this context, the notion of 
responsibility expresses the ethical character of the infinite debt towards 
each singularity, or individual others, which Derrida (1988) defines unde-
cidability, the fact that each decision represents a leap of faith made in 
relation to the singularity of a context (Critchley 1999). If the categorical 
imperative of Kantian moral law requires to measure a decision against a 
universal maxim, the idea of infinite responsibility arises from the context 
of a singular experience and acquires a universal character in the notion of 
the other’s infinite demand made on the individual. The passage from the 
solitude of the thinking self to the sociality that is established with the 
other encountered in her/his singularity is constituted through language, 
from the dimension of the said to that of the saying.
concLusIon. IntercuLturaLIty and the dIstInctIon 
between the Saying and the Said
The two linguistic dimensions of the saying and the said coincide with two 
temporalities, the diachronic and the synchronic. The diachronic relates to 
the organization of perceptions and of experiences in a coherent temporal 
flow. In this temporality, language fixes the perceptions received from the 
external world into meaningful notions. The said, in other words, shapes 
and organises experiences into the know categories handed to the indi-
vidual by the cultural milieu in which s/he is situated. Cultural traditions 
belong to this dimension of language, as available categories that allow 
consciousness to make sense of reality. In the diachronic dimension of 
temporality, the flow of time is interrupted by the other, of the embodied 
presence of the other person. If the said fixes meaning, the saying expresses 
another dimension of human expression, which is pre-linguistic. Rather 
than being opposed, the two linguistic dimensions are complementary: 
the event of the saying needs available categories in order to be processed 
by consciousness. However, the saying is never completely exhausted or 
grasped by the said. The saying represents an irreducible remainder of dif-
ference between the content of the said and what defies categorisation:
It is only in the said that, in the epos of saying, the diachrony of time is 
synchronised into a time that is recallable, and becomes a theme. (…) But 




The presence of the saying underlying the said challenges the idea of the 
transparency of language, or the perfect correspondence between word 
and meaning (Ferri 2014). This interplay between the two modalities of 
language, which represents Levinas’s ‘linguistic turn’ in this ethical phi-
losophy, offers an interesting perspective for intercultural communica-
tion. One the one hand, meaning is fixed, resulting in essentialist 
categorising of the other; on the other, the ethical relation with the other 
is opened in open-ended dialogue. The latter modality of communica-
tion, however, requires that the self is prepared to renounce the tendency 
to establish an outcome to the encounter. The saying, in other words, is 
the meeting between self and other in speech, accepting the open-ended 
nature of the interaction, counter to the tendency in much intercultural 
communication research to fix meaning under the pre-established script 
of communicative competence and the effective transmission of content 
described in intercultural training. The unfolding of the saying in dia-
logue puts into question assumptions made in relation to the other, fore-
grounding reciprocal interaction between others. This ethical aspect of 
language, based on embodiment and presence to one another, throws the 
self in a situation which subverts pre-established categories and places 
communication in the realm of everyday contact and concern for the 
other, which Levinas illustrates in the most basic acts of politeness between 
two interlocutors:
In discourse I have always distinguished, in fact, between the saying and 
the said. That the saying must bear a said is a necessity of the same order 
as that which imposes a society with laws, institutions and social relations. 
But the saying is the fact that before the face I do not simply remain there 
contemplating it, I respond to it. The saying is a way of greeting the 
Other, but to greet the Other is already to answer for him. It is difficult 
to be silent in someone’s presence; this difficulty has its ultimate founda-
tion in this  signification proper to the saying, whatever is the said. It is 
necessary to speak of something, of the rain and fine weather, no matter 
what, but to speak, to respond to him and already to answer for him. 
(Levinas 1985, p. 88)
Interaction between embodied subjects is thus characterised by an ethical 
character that surfaces in communication, when concerns with reliability, 
effectiveness and performance are set aside in favour of concern for the 
other qua other.
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CHAPTER 4
Dwelling or Sojourning? Modalities 
of Interculturality
Abstract This chapter contrasts three models of competence: Deardorff’s 
pyramid model, the ICOPROMO project and Phipps’ notion of intercul-
tural competence in terms of dwelling. It considers the ethical implications 
of Levinas’s reflection on the nature of language and on the relationship 
between self and other for the development of a framework that addresses 
the limitations of current conceptualisations of competence in intercul-
tural communication. In particular, this chapter enters in a productive 
confrontation with Phipps and her notion of intercultural competence as 
dwelling. The main aim of this chapter is to propose a notion of the inter-
cultural in terms of sojourning as more apt to describe the condition of 
precarity and ‘messiness’ of intercultural living.
Keywords Intercultural competence • Intercultural speaker • Pyramid 
model • Dialogic interculturalism • Otherness • Assessment of intercultural 
competence
IntroductIon1
The present chapter problematizes the epistemological assumptions 
underpinning two intercultural competences frameworks as paradigmatic 
of a neo-essentialist approach to intercultural communication, namely 
Deardorff’s pyramid model (2006, 2009) and the ICOPROMO project 
(Glaser et al. 2007). To these two modes, an alternative understanding of 
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competence discussed in this chapter is based on the notion of dwelling 
(Phipps 2007), which illustrates a novel approach in presenting intercul-
tural encounters as learning processes that lead to dwelling in previously 
unfamiliar cultural spaces. Through a critique of the discourse of effective-
ness that characterises both Deardorff’s pyramid model and the 
ICOPROMO project, and the critical engagement with the Heideggerian 
underpinnings of Phipps’ notion of dwelling, this chapter introduces a 
conceptualisation of dialogic interaction that is situated in the –inter, or 
the immanent and processual space of the intercultural, thus emphasising 
the provisional and open-ended dimension of interaction. Phipps utilises 
the Heideggerian metaphor of language as a dwelling place, situating the 
activity of learning another language as preparation to dwell in a new 
place. As intended by Phipps, dwelling in a language represents the result 
of an intercultural experience that provides the language learner with a 
sense of the fleeting and fragile nature of communication between people 
who may not share the same cultural perspective. However, due to 
Heidegger’s conservative view of the inextricable bond between culture, 
language and soil as markers of a shared identity, this chapter proposes a 
notion of the intercultural in terms of sojourning (Cavell 1996, 2005), as 
more apt to capture the condition of precarity and ‘messiness’ of intercul-
tural living described by Phipps.
the PyramId model
Deardorff (2006, 2009) provides a competence framework based on a 
pyramid model in which the main four elements are ordered hierarchically: 
attitudes, skills, knowledge, internal and external outcomes. All four ele-
ments are applied to guide and assess the development of intercultural 
competence in a variety of contexts. In the pyramid model, intercultural 
competence is defined in terms of effectiveness in communication achieved 
through the following:
• Attitudes: a combination of respect, openness and curiosity in show-
ing interest in others and their cultures.
• Knowledge: in this model, culture is defined as a set of values, beliefs 
and norms held by a group of people. Culture shapes behaviour and 
consequently it influences interaction with others. Thus, from this 





• Skills: the skills required for the development of intercultural com-
petences refer to the acquisition and processing of knowledge, the 
ability to observe, listen, evaluate, analyse, interpret and relativise.
• Internal outcomes: ideally, the combination of attitudes, knowl-
edge and skills lead to flexibility, adaptability, ethnorelativity and 
empathy, meaning the ability to respond to others according to the 
ways in which they desire to be treated.
• External outcomes: here, communicative behaviour can be assessed 
in determining how effectively and appropriately the individual per-
forms in intercultural situations, particularly in showing cultural sen-
sitivity and adherence to cultural norms.
The framework describes language as a vehicle to understand others’ 
worldviews, so that an ideal place for the development of intercultural 
competence is the foreign language classroom, where it is possible to grad-
uate ‘global ready students who are not only fluent in another language but 
who can also successfully navigate other cultures’ (Deardorff 2006, p. 42). 
The assessment of competence relating to this pyramid model is based on:
• Prioritising goals relating to intercultural communication compe-
tence: goals can be set in advance according to purpose, ‘to deter-
mine which specific elements of intercultural competence should be the 
focus of programmatic efforts and assessment endeavors’ (Deardorff 
2011, p. 72).
• Setting realistic and measurable outcomes through a multimethod 
and multiperspective plan. This means collecting a range of evidence 
both direct and indirect (Deardorff 2016).
• Collecting direct evidence in the form of learning contracts, 
e- portfolios including reflection papers, photos and other documen-
tation of learning, critical reflection which pushes learners to move 
beyond descriptive reflection, and finally performance in intercul-
tural situations. Indirect evidence is collected through surveys, inter-
views and focus groups (Deardorff 2016).
The final outcome of this process of acquisition of competences allows 
the self to move from the personal level, represented by attitudes, to an 
inter-personal and interactive level. This conclusion, however, poses an 
epistemological issue residing in the passage from an autonomous, mono-
cultural self to inter-relationality that occurs as the result of the acquisition 
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of skills. In fact, although the acquisition of the required attitudes leads to 
appropriate cultural behaviours in intercultural situations, the role of the 
other in shaping competence is neglected in the emphasis placed on skills 
and measurable, realistic outcomes. As a consequence, what Deardorff 
interprets as inter-relationality stands for a change in behaviour generating 
from a static notion of culture occurring after the acquisition of compe-
tences, rather than through a process of transformation originating from 
the ‘inter’, the processual act of interaction. This point is evident in rela-
tion to the issue of a Western bias in the pyramid model, which is acknowl-
edged through the notion of relationality between Western and 
non-Western perspectives and the integration of these relational aspects 
beyond the knowledge, skills and attitudes delineated in the pyramid 
model. A relational model of competence from this perspective is organ-
ised according to the abstract notions of a Western self and a non-Western 
other, and the acquisition of separate skill-sets needed in interaction in 
order to demonstrate a degree of reciprocal adaptation. However, the 
acquisition of this global model of competence neglects the two dimen-
sions of symbolic power and the symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1991) attached 
to learning a foreign language, notably English (Pennycook 2007).
With post-structuralist theory the notion of discourse becomes promi-
nent in regard to the role of language in society and in establishing a rela-
tion between knowledge and power. As Fairclough argues, language and 
power are closely connected parts of a wider network, which includes the 
practices and institutions that produce societal formations. Power exer-
cised through the use of language with the “manufacture of consent” 
(Fairclough 1989, p. 4), is opposed to the exercise of power through coer-
cion. According to Foucault (1977) power is a pervasive practice that 
operates within institutional apparatuses to produce control. In this sense, 
discourse is not strictly linguistic, but it comprises all the social practices 
that combine to create an object of knowledge. The notion of symbolic 
capital attached to the use of English is particularly relevant in the two 
models of intercultural competence examined in this chapter. The concept 
of symbolic capital elaborated by Bourdieu (1991), compares linguistic 
exchange to an economic exchange, in the sense that words are not only 
signs that convey meanings, but they also represent a linguistic capital. 
Words are ‘signs of wealth intended to be evaluated and appreciated’ and 
‘signs of authority intended to be believed and obeyed’ (Bourdieu 1991, 




represents the most valuable linguistic capital with the highest symbolic 
profit. For Bourdieu, the prestige associated with the use of a dominant 
form of language is the result of social mechanisms, which are reproduced 
by institutional powers. In particular, the educational system is invested 
with the specific role of divulging the standard variety of a national lan-
guage, thus establishing a ‘hierarchy of linguistic practices’ (Bourdieu 
1991, p. 49). The value attached to linguistic practices is therefore the 
result of habitus, a learned process that takes shape first within the sphere 
of the family, or ‘primary market’, and subsequently in other ‘markets’, 
notably schools, where the primary model can either be valued or deval-
ued, if not conform to the dominant linguistic practices. In this process, 
language becomes a linguistic capital and schools are placed in a central 
position in the reproduction of the ideology of a standard, unitary, correct 
language. This domination is achieved not through overt coercion but it 
is transmitted in the ordinary aspects of everyday life, to the extent that 
the idea of a standard and correct language becomes a self evident and 
transparent idea that requires no further investigation. This unquestioned 
status of language in the pyramid model, particularly the symbolic capital 
of English, recalls Cameron’s argument that language is treated as a given 
entity, ‘like the mythical turtle that supports the world on his back’ (Cameron 
2006, p. 143). In a similar fashion, Deardorff does not explain the contex-
tual reasons that bring individual language users to subscribe to the domi-
nant ideology that underpins the notions of effectiveness and reliability of 
communicative competence. While language is a vehicle for the fashioning 
and expression of ideologies, it is at the same time shaped by social and 
ideological forces, as argued by Voloshinov (1972), meaning that signs are 
multi-accented, reflecting the different social positions occupied by indi-
vidual speakers. From this perspective, the apparent consensus  surrounding 
language hides ‘the reality of continual struggle over the sign’ (Voloshinov 
1972, p.  144), generated by the material differences existing between 
social groups. Adopting this relational and contested view of language, it 
can be argued that the Pyramid competence model posits language as 
expression of an abstract monocultural speaker, while the complexity 
entailed in the relation between speakers and the language employed in 
communication is reduced to the effects of miscommunication due to cul-
tural difference.




As in the pyramid model, responding to the necessities of global trade 
represents a major preoccupation in the ICOPROMO model (Glaser et al. 
2007). However, the ICOPROMO project combines the preoccupation 
with professional development in competitive markets and the idea of 
transformation. Indeed, this model of competence is defined ‘transforma-
tional’ because
it articulates the journey the individual undergoes when becoming aware of 
intercultural challenges as a result of his/her mobility or that of others with 
whom he/she must communicate effectively. (Glaser et al. 2007, p. 15)
Both the ICOPROMO and the pyramid training programs are targeted at 
educators and facilitators working with undergraduate, graduate students 
and professionals to help them develop language and cultural awareness 
that will facilitate interaction in intercultural situations. The transforma-
tional journey of the individual towards the acquisition of competences is 
represented by a traffic light in which the individual is initially positioned 
on the red light prior to the development of intercultural skills, moving to 
the amber and green lights once he/she becomes able to interact effec-
tively with cultural difference. The theoretical premise of this journey is 
individuated by the authors in the necessities presented by the ‘new world 
order’, meaning the global flows of trade and communication which in 
their account has exposed individuals to a higher intensity of cultural dif-
ference and consequently to challenges that are linguistic, cultural and 
emotional (Ferri 2016, p.  65). The authors employ the term ‘mono- 
cultural identity’ (Glaser et al. 2007, p. 16), indicating the programmatic 
aim to cause an attitudinal change towards the other and to cope with 
cultural difference in the background of global challenges. Bringing about 
attitudinal and behavioural changes, requires increased awareness of the 
self and the other, the acquisition of cultural knowledge, sense-making, 
perspective-taking, relationship building, and interestingly the ability to 
assume social responsibility. This complex of skills results in intercultural 
mobility, or ‘the ability to interact effectively in intercultural professional 
contexts’ (Glaser et al. 2007, p. 17). This transformational model finds its 
theoretical underpinning in field theory (Lewin 1935), which relates 
behaviour to the interaction between personality and environmental pres-




behaviour can be influenced through tailored intervention. In this compe-
tence framework, the first step is represented by a developing awareness of 
self and other, dealing in the specific with culture shock or ‘cultural 
fatigue’ (Glaser et al. 2007, p. 31) resulting from a first encounter with 
cultural difference. According to the idea of culture shock, being exposed 
to a different culture leads to miscommunication and conflict, requiring 
the ability to develop sense-making and interpreting, and the ability of 
meaning-making, as well as the skill to identify and understand values and 
beliefs. Moreover, perspective-taking allows individuals to look at reality 
from different viewpoints, to develop empathy and tolerance, flexibility 
and the ability to decentre. At this stage, effective intercultural communi-
cation results intercultural mobility (Glaser et al. 2007, p. 43) although, 
according to the authors, this mobility needs to be contextualised within 
a broader project of democratic citizenship, which promotes intercultural 
interaction and dialogue in complex societies and emerging communities 
created by intercultural contact (see Ferri 2016, p. 65).
the IdealIsed Intercultural sPeaker In the PyramId 
model and the IcoPromo Project
The problematization of the pyramid model of competence and the 
ICOPROMO project highlights a number of issues that relate to their epis-
temological and ontological assumptions as illustrated in Table 4.1, with 
the sequence of the acquisition of competences employed in both models. 
A problematic aspect in these formulations of intercultural communicative 
competence is represented by the emphasis placed on the consciousness of 
the intercultural speaker, which focuses on the cultural divide between self 
and other. Communication is examined in reference to awareness of cul-
tural differences and with the use of neutral, scientific vocabulary, expressed 
Table 4.1 Sequence of acquisition of competences




Need to become competitive
Response to culture shock
To acquire knowledge of another 
culture and the patterns of behaviour 
associated with it
To relativise and dispel stereotypes 
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in the language employed in intercultural training such as competence, 
skills, training and effectiveness (e.g. Hofstede and Hofstede 2004; 
Deardorff 2006, 2009; Spencer-Oatey and Stadler 2009). This emphasis 
on consciousness and on a functional, instrumental understanding of com-
munication influences the ways in which ethical responsibility is understood 
in intercultural research (e.g. in Guilherme et al. 2010). The transforma-
tion of the self into a responsible, intercultural being is presented as a pro-
cess beginning in a fully bounded individual who acquires the necessary 
competences to deal with the initial cultural shock that occurs as a conse-
quence of the encounter with another culture. Following the acquisition of 
competence, not only the individual is then able to deal effectively and 
sensitively towards the cultural other, but is also able to display varying 
degrees of criticality and responsibility in dealing with members of other 
cultures. This ideal of individual autonomy emerges in both frameworks in 
the shape of a self-sufficient and self-governing individual, leaving unexam-
ined the role of the other in interaction.
From this perspective, although the dimension of critical intercultural 
citizenship developed by Guilherme (2002) is included in the ICOPROMO 
project, and a critical approach to a static vision of culture is advocated in 
Deardorff’s model, the practical necessity to become competitive in the 
global market is taken as the principal element that guides the epistemo-
logical assumptions underpinning both frameworks, which relate to the 
conception of the self as an autonomous being. This stance is illustrated by 
Deardorff in reference to intercultural learning and intercultural courses 
in further education as a means to equip students for a ‘more global, inter-
dependent world’,
How can we prepare our students to comprehend the multitude of coun-
tries and cultures that may have an impact on their lives and careers? More 
broadly, what knowledge, skills, and attitudes do our students need if they 
are to be successful in the twenty-first century? (…) Beyond integration of 
intercultural competence outcomes within courses, it is important to under-
stand that intercultural learning is transformational learning, which requires 
experiences (often beyond the classroom) that lead to this transformation. 
(…). To this end, service learning and education abroad become two mech-
anisms by which students’ intercultural competence can be further devel-
oped, leading to students’ transformation. (Deardorff 2011, pp. 69–70)
The role of global trade is acknowledged as the initiating force behind the 




Holliday (2011) defines in terms of a reification of intercultural training 
and the creation of a product, which is marketed as intercultural compe-
tence. In this way, the intercultural process is presented as the meeting of 
separate cultural entities, and the role of the intercultural trainer is to facil-
itate and provide the tools to help navigate and interpret behaviour as 
expression of cultural difference. The starting point in this process is rep-
resented by the notion of culture shock, or cultural fatigue, which is 
assumed to initiate the transformational process that changes the individ-
ual from monocultural to an interculturally competent entity. The idea of 
culture shock derives from anthropology and the four stages of adaptation 
identified by Oberg (1960), beginning with the honeymoon stage during 
initial contact with a different culture, followed by negative feelings of 
anxiety, rejection, anger and frustration, ending with adjustment and 
finally adaption to the new culture. This concept of culture shock has been 
widely criticised, although it has become embedded in popular conscious-
ness and it is widely used to designate the shock upon encountering an 
‘exotic’ culture (Kuppens and Mast 2012). In this sense, what is described 
in terms of culture shock hides the complexity of factors that influence 
communication in intercultural encounters, so that miscommunication 
due to lack of sociolinguistic competence in the use of a dominant lan-
guage, low socio-economic status, power imbalance and ideological con-
structs of culture, are all attributed to cultural difference. Therefore, when 
culture becomes the principal explanatory category to understand inter-
cultural communication, the notion of competence is presented as a fix, a 
set of tools that the individual can utilise to become tolerant and under-
standing of other cultural beings in the context of a globalised neo-liberal 
market, here understood in terms of the deterritorialised flows of global 
trade illustrated in Hardt and Negri (2000) and Harvey (2005), character-
ised by competitiveness and the necessity to interact effectively. Crucially, 
the focus on cultural difference prevalent in intercultural training, based 
on the notion of cultural shock experienced by the individual, leaves unac-
counted for that aspect of globalisation which relates to power and cul-
tural capital, or global flows of ‘interested knowledge, hegemonic power, and 
cultural capital’ (Kumaravadivelu 2006, p. 1). In other words, it neglects 
the socio/cultural distinctions of global capitalism. The neo-essentialist 
dichotomy between a Western perspective on the one side, and a separate 
cultural block that includes all non-Western cultures on the other, is 
resonant of the opposition noted by Holliday (2011) between the domi-
nant, hegemonic discourses of the West and the process of othering 
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towards peripheral discourses emanating from non-Western perspectives. 
In other words, the hegemonic discourses of the West position their own 
production of knowledge in superior and often ‘scientific’ terms, whilst 
alternative discourses are interpolated as cultural products of the ‘other’, 
in a dynamic that recalls Spivak’s (2004) notion of epistemic violence. As 
such, these peripheral and non-Western perspectives are invoked from a 
neo- essentialist position in the name of the ideal of universal tolerance of 
the other, reduced to an idealised intercultural speaker. When the empiri-
cal observation of intercultural interlocutors is abstracted from the under-
lying social relations and hegemonic structures that are at play during 
communication, it generates the idealistic notion of a competent intercul-
tural speaker, which represents a mystification of the social relations at play 
during communicative interactions. The term mystification is employed 
here in relation to the concept of commodity fetishism (Marx 1974), 
according to which a commodity is understood in terms of its monetary 
value as the universal equivalent for exchange and not as the product of a 
specific set of social relations of production. Thus commodities acquire an 
intrinsic value that mystifies their material character, the fact that they are 
the product of human labour,
It is precisely this finished form of the world of commodities—the money 
form—which conceals the social character of private labour and the social 
relations between the individual workers, by making those relations appear 
as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly. 
(Marx 1974, p. 78)
Similarly, the ideal of a competent intercultural speaker endowed with the 
characteristics of tolerance, flexibility, reflexivity, ability to decentre and 
open mindedness hides the material conditions in which the individual is 
embedded. This idealistic notion of a competent intercultural speaker is 
often articulated in the literature on intercultural competence as an indi-
vidual learning discovery of the aforementioned intercultural characteris-
tics, e.g. Deardorff (2006) and Wiseman (2003) in reference to the 
development of intercultural competence; Chen and Starosta (1998, 
2000), McAllister et al. (2006), Guilherme et al. (2010), Jackson (2011) 
in relation to the acquisition of intercultural sensitivity and the develop-
ment of reflexivity. As a consequence of this process of mystification, these 
characteristics become transcendental categories, meaning that their 




intercultural speaker. In other words, the definition of the competent 
intercultural speaker is established apriori through categories that render 
possible its constitution as an object of experience. This process, however, 
relates to idealised individuals who exhibit the desired characteristics whilst 
embarking on a journey of intercultural learning, in which the outcome 
has been delineated in advance as the achievement of intercultural compe-
tence in terms of discovery of other cultural perspectives, the development 
of tolerance and the ability to shift cultural perspectives.
Intercultural comPetence as dwellIng
In contrast to both the pyramid model and the ICOPROMO project, 
Phipps (2007) emphasises messiness, unpredictability and the embodied 
nature of languages in specific cultural contexts as cultural artefacts and 
markers of identity. This notion of messiness proposed by Phipps contrasts 
with the idea of culture shock described in reference to the Pyramid model 
and the ICOPROMO project. On the one side, the idea of culture shock 
expresses the experience of intercultural encounters as a problem, a poten-
tial source of incomprehension and difficulty. On the other, messiness 
articulates the uncertainty and the precariousness of interculturality in 
terms of an existential challenge in which the self discovers uncharted pos-
sibilities. In developing the notion of dwelling, Phipps utilises the 
Heideggerian metaphor of language as a dwelling place, describing the 
activity of learning another language as preparation to dwell in a new 
place. As intended by Phipps, dwelling in a language represents the result 
of an intercultural experience that provides the language learner with a 
sense of the fleeting and fragile nature of communication between people 
who may not share the same cultural perspective. Languages are fully 
embodied entities, artefacts that function as markers of identity not reduc-
ible to a set of skills to be mastered through the acquisition of grammatical 
competence. Reflecting on both traditional (e.g. Hall, Hofstede) and criti-
cal (e.g. Byram, Guilherme) accounts of intercultural communication, 
Phipps argues against the tendency to search for ‘a quick fix’ to conflicts 
that arise in intercultural contexts. According to Phipps, only partial and 
situated answers can be found ‘in the quick human relatedness, in the con-
texts of neighbourliness and of learning together as an everyday process of 
dwelling in the real world’ (2007, p. 26). From this perspective, learning 
languages and experiencing communication across distinct traditions is 
not a problem in need of ‘technological fixes’ (Phipps 2007, p. 23), but an 
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occasion to acquire a dwelling perspective, ‘one which is heavier, messier, 
requires time to be taken in and with languages, people and praxis’ (ibid.). 
Despite the evident merits of such a perspective, Heidegger’s view of the 
inextricable bond between culture, language and soil as markers of a 
shared identity, presents a number of conceptual issues worth examining.
Heidegger’s wider concerns regarding the relationship between being 
and Dasein (or the individual as being-in-the-world, designating the con-
crete structure of human beings in their predominant state of ‘everyday-
ness’) permeate his reflections on language. It is through language that 
Dasein becomes the guardian, or the “shepherd” of being: language 
intended as poetic creation discloses the ontological nature of the Dasein 
in harbouring the meaning of being. However, this authentic relationship 
of the Dasein with language has been lost as a result of the oblivion of 
being in Western philosophy: ‘Man acts as though he were the shaper and 
master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man’ 
(Heidegger 1971, p. 146). According to this theory, the primordial and 
true character of language is to be found in dwelling, in letting the mean-
ing emerge from everyday objects through the bond that exists between a 
language and its own place of dwelling. The Heideggerian notion of 
dwelling refers to the Old English and High German word Buan, which 
means to remain, to stay in a place:
The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on 
the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth 
as a mortal. It means to dwell. The old word bauen, which says that man is 
insofar as he dwells, this word bauen however also means at the same time 
to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to 
cultivate the vine. (Heidegger 1971, p. 147)
Heidegger contrasts calculative thinking, which predominates in modern 
scientific thought, to meditative thinking and attributes the former to the 
condition of homelessness of modernity and the latter to dwelling in a 
native soil, claiming that the rootedness and the autochthony of man are 
threatened by industrialization,
Many Germans have lost their homeland, have had to leave their villages and 
towns, have been driven from their native soil. (…) They have been caught 
in the turmoil of the big cities, and have resettled in the wastelands of indus-





In this reading of modernity, man is alienated from this fertile contact with 
the native soil, and language has become a mere tool for instrumental 
thinking, leading to alienation and inauthenticity. It seems thus, that in 
acknowledging the often contradictory and situated nature of communica-
tion, and the impossibility to achieve a formula that would clear all misun-
derstanding and miscommunication in intercultural situations, Phipps has 
not readily accounted for Heidegger’s rhetorical and nationalistic use of the 
notion of a bond between soil and language (see also Levinas 1990; Adorno 
2003; Gauthier 2011 on this issue). Although in her interpretation Phipps 
emphasises the existential dimension of language as a marker of identity 
that is fluid and embodied rather than nationalistic or identitarian, it can be 
argued whether the Heideggerian notion of dwelling best describes a non-
essentialist understanding of intercultural communication. Both Levinas 
(1990) and Adorno (2003) have addressed the problematic nature of the 
bond between language and dwelling, the former confronting the dichot-
omy between native and strangers that stems from the idea of dwelling and 
the latter with an analysis of the language employed by Heidegger.
Adorno describes the language employed by Heidegger in terms of 
‘jargon’, referring to the aura that emanates from the a-historical and 
decontextualized repetition of a limited number of words which acquire 
the character of essences tinged with the aura of transcendental revelation, 
particularly the terminology regarding being (which is capitalised in 
Heideggerian texts), existence and authenticity (Adorno 2003; Hearfield 
2004). For Adorno, this use of language creates the sense of a mythical 
past that inspires reverence and, as a consequence, it cancels the mediation 
of the thinking subject in the dialectic between word and thing, providing 
the illusion that words appear from a higher dimension to that of the 
empirical world. Adorno attacks the idea of rootedness and its expression 
in the archaic, poetic language to which Heidegger recurs in order to 
illustrate the relatedness between dwelling, authentic thinking and lan-
guage, describing it as ‘washed out clichés in plough-and-furrow novels 
(…)’; continuing:
Whoever is forced by the nature of his work to stay in one place, gladly 
makes a virtue out of necessity. He tries to convince himself and others that 
his bound-ness is of a higher order. (Adorno 2003, pp. 44–45)
The critique of the ontological significance of place and native soil, or 
autochthony, is further elaborated by Levinas in reference to dwelling as 
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the place where the wanderer finds refuge. In this reading, Heidegger’s 
vision of rootedness creates a dichotomy between natives and strangers,
One’s implementation in a landscape, one’s attachment to place, without 
which the universe would become insignificant and would hardly exist, is the 
very splitting of humanity into natives and strangers. (Levinas 1990, p. 232)
Furthermore, whereas Heidegger laments technological advancement, 
Levinas welcomes technology which ‘wrenches us out of the Heideggerian 
world and the superstitions regarding Place’ (Levinas 1990, p. 232; capi-
talisation in original). In line with Adorno’s critique, Levinas describes 
with irony the transcendent use of everyday language and the rediscovery 
of the holy aspect hiding beneath the mundane that, according to 
Heidegger, allows the ineffable to become manifest,
to follow a path that winds its way through fields, to feel the unity created 
by the bridge, the bridge that links the two river banks and by the architec-
ture of buildings, the presence of a tree, the chiaroscuro, the forests, the 
mystery of things, of a jug, of worn out shoes of a peasant girl, the gleam 
from a carafe of wine sitting on a tablecloth. (Levinas 1990, p. 232)
This archaic portrait exaggerates Heideggerian language, evoking a return 
to the true significance of being gleaming behind everyday objects in their 
authentic relationship with place. Heidegger’s return to an originary 
understanding of the truth of being is replaced by Levinas with a depar-
ture from ontological thinking- or thinking about being, to ethical think-
ing, in particular the ethical necessity of welcoming the other 
unconditionally. If being builds and cultivates (Heidegger 1971), in 
Levinas the thinking subject is destabilised by the arrival of the other, who 
poses the ethical demand that dwelling becomes a place of unconditional 
welcome. This form of ethical thinking opposes Heidegger’s philosophy 
of place and rootedness with a philosophy of the ‘émigré’, which estab-
lishes the dignity of those who leave their native soil,
He or she who emigrates is fully human: the migration of man does not 
destroy, does not demolish the meaning of being. (Levinas 2006, p. 101)
The philosophy of the migrant, developed in Levinas’s Talmudic writings 




of refuge for the exiles and the oppressed fleeing persecution (Eisenstadt 
2003), can be contrasted to Heidegger’s longing for a return to the 
authenticity of a native soil. Although this ethics of hospitality (Derrida 
2000, 2001) reflects the aporia between the ideal of unconditional wel-
come and the reality of legal and political limitations, it represents never-
theless a promise of deferred justice, or an ideal that ought to guide ethical 
reflection. In this manifestation of the other as hospitality towards the 
émigré resides the essence of language as sociality and ethical commitment 
to dialogue: ‘it puts in common a world hitherto mine’ (Levinas 2008, 
p.  174). This intersubjectivity has been described as saying in Chap. 3 
(Levinas 1998): language is not the expression of a higher truth of being 
that is disclosed through an authentic bond with a native soil, rather lan-
guage establishes sociality in the form of dialogic interaction. Dialogue as 
saying challenges Heidegger’s notion of language as the source of the 
meaning of being in virtue of its rootedness in a native soil, and the idea 
of awakening to an authentic form of language that lay dormant under-
neath its everyday and mundane use. Thus, with the notion of saying it is 
possible to eschew the conception of the naturalness of a native language 
as it appears in Heidegger, accompanied by the benign image of a mother 
tongue that we use naturally from birth in virtue of its belonging to a place 
of dwelling. In this context, Cavell’s (2005) attempt to reconcile the 
union of dwelling, thinking and language with the philosophy of the ‘émi-
gré’, rescues the idea from the rhetoric of rootedness and authenticity in 
favour of a more dynamic understanding of dwelling as ‘living lightly’ and 
being prepared ‘for departure and the new’ (Standish and Cavell 2012, 
p. 169). Cavell, reflecting on both Heidegger’s and Thoreau’s depictions 
of land in terms of settling, ploughing, growing, tending and care, con-
trasts two modalities of dwelling: the transcendent emphasis on the fulfil-
ment of destiny of Dasein through the authentic relationship with the 
native land that is so important to Heidegger, and the worldly tending of 
the land in Walden, the character in Thoreau’s novel (1995), through the 
modality of ‘sojourning’,
The river poetizes the human being because, in providing ‘the unity of local-
ity and journeying’, it conceals and reveals Dasein’s being and becoming 
‘homely’, ‘homelike’, I might say homebound. Walden’s word for maintain-
ing something like this unity, in its opening paragraph, is ‘sojourning’, living 
each day, everywhere and nowhere, as a task and an event. (Cavell 2005, 
p. 229)
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Cavell here recognises the fundamental human need to dwell and inhabit, 
to be at home, but points at the same time to “the essential immigrancy of 
the human” (2005, p. 229), or the fact that dwelling is a precarious state 
that can be interrupted both voluntarily and through forced exile in the 
events of war and political upheaval. Returning to Phipps’ notion of learn-
ing a language as finding a new place of dwelling, it can be argued that the 
experience of learning a new language rather than being comparable to 
finding a new dwelling is more akin to a displacement of the familiar and 
to an awakening that reveals the arbitrariness of language itself, its socially 
constructed nature and its internal stratification (Bakhtin 1981), or to use 
Phipps’ terminology, its messiness and embodied character. According to 
Cavell (2005), there are three modes of understanding in relation to 
culture:
The patriotic, based on the notion of native soil.
The cosmopolitan, which seeks the common principle of humanity.
The multiculturalist, funded on the principle of the politics of recogni-
tion and the comparison between cultural traditions.
A common pitfall of all three approaches, argues Cavell, is the contrasting 
relationship established between the native and the foreign, whether in 
view of a form of solidarity between different nations (the patriotic), of 
fusion (the cosmopolitan) or harmony (the multiculturalist). What is miss-
ing is an interrogation of the familiar and what is “allegedly native to us 
(…)” or, more specifically, an understanding of the problematic nature of 
the concept of a native language with its accompanying cultural identity 
that, when scrutinised closely, reveals a “sense of the rivenness of home, the 
rift within ourselves” (Cavell 1996, p. 134). In other words, beneath the 
surface of cultural identity and language resides this internal split of the 
self, the fact that what we call home “cannot be a stable shelter” because we 
are in a state of immigrancy from the start (ibid.). This means that, although 
we are born into a language community from which we acquire social 
meanings, we live from the beginning in a process of translation, in nego-
tiating the modalities in which the language and the conventions of the 
community are appropriated in unique ways. In this sense, we are never at 
home within a cultural tradition, but we live in a state of translation and 
migration, in constant tension between freedom and tradition. This exis-
tential fact of incompleteness of self and other, according to Saito (2009, 




untranslatable words and concepts surface in the course of linguistic 
exchange. According to Saito, this experiencing of the unfamiliar through 
linguistic exchange is comparable to a re-engagement with the ordinary 
from a new perspective. This means that words and concepts that have 
become common currency in everyday usage are rediscovered in transla-
tion. Furthermore, Saito extends the notion of translation to intra- linguistic 
contexts, arguing that due to the lack of transparency between words and 
their meanings the lives of human beings are always in a process of transla-
tion. Similarly, Derrida (1998) employs the notion of translation to ques-
tion the concepts of cultural identity and native language, interrogating the 
notion of native language, due to the precarious nature of cultural identity 
granted in virtue of belonging to a linguistic group. Due to the paradoxical 
situation of speaking a language that does not belong to us, because it was 
inherited from a linguistic community, language is not a natural entity, a 
mother tongue that belongs naturally to a speaking subject, it is rather a 
phantasm of possession that in its more extreme manifestations becomes 
the symbol of appropriation that motivates nationalist aggression and 
‘monoculturalist homo-hegemony’ (Derrida 1998, p.  64), or identitarian 
hegemony. In this Derridean perspective, language is not a property, it can-
not be possessed, stemming from a source that is ever- receding: the phrase 
‘prosthesis of origin’ (Derrida 1998) indicates precisely this impossibility to 
establish an origin of language, a mother tongue viewed as a natural entity 
possessed by individual speaking subjects (Wortham 2010). The notions of 
sojourning and incompleteness allow to reconfigure the relationship 
between self and other in terms of a relationship between two others. 
Understood in this manner, intercultural encounters become an opportu-
nity to discover the incompleteness of the self and to accept that the other 
can never be fully grasped. In other words, the intercultural is reconfigured 
in terms of dialogic interaction.
a dIalogIc understandIng of InteractIon
Dialogism addresses three aspects of intercultural communication: the 
interdependence of self/other, the acceptance of uncertainty and finally an 
understanding of power relations. In this sense, this understanding of 
interaction is processual, contextual and multiperspectival. The processual 
aspect relates to the ‘inter’ of interculturality, the fact that meanings are 
constructed in interaction during communicative exchanges. The multi-
perspectival indicates that all three elements (interdependence self/other, 
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acceptance of uncertainty and awareness of power) are necessary in order 
to define dialogic interaction, as opposed to the acquisition of separate, 
discrete skills prior to interaction, which are employed in instrumental 
models of competence to guide communicative exchanges starting from a 
pre-defined image of the other.
the Processual
The starting point in delineating the broad features a dialogic model of 
interaction is that the individual is not a monocultural entity. It is an 
accepted argument in academic research that identity is not monolithic, 
but it is ever-evolving and influenced by a variety of multiple allegiances 
and group memberships, and therefore it is not exhausted by narrow defi-
nitions of cultural belonging confined within the category of national 
identity (see Hall and du Gay 1996; Hall 1997). However, although the 
notion of multifaceted belonging moves away from culturalism in terms of 
the assignment of fixed cultural identities, the danger is that in the theori-
sation of intercultural competence behaviour is still explained in cultural 
terms, albeit within a conception of culture that is more dynamic and flex-
ible (Dervin et  al. 2011). Following from this, it can be assumed that 
behaviour is determined by the context of interaction and not by culture, 
and that the development of dialogic intercultural interaction is  dependent 
on the recognition of the following three factors that influence dialogue: 
the interdependence of self and other, ideological constructions of cul-
ture, and power imbalance.
The Interdependence of Self and Other As argued in Chap. 3, the modality 
of the said (Levinas 1998) can be used as an interpretive category to 
describe the essentialist categorisation of the other and the fixing of mean-
ing and outcomes in intercultural encounters. Under this interpretative 
category, observing the other through the lenses of reliability and validity 
in pursuit of a form of transparent communication forecloses the possibil-
ity of creating new meanings in interaction. When in the modality of the 
said, the self is in control of the interaction. However, the other modality 
of discourse named saying by Levinas, indicates that the self renounces 
control in favour of unpredictability. Encountering the other in this 
modality engenders an existential experience which, as discussed in Chap. 3, 
can be described in terms of accusativity, or when other exceeds the cate-




other, as reciprocal engagement stems from the experiential sphere of prac-
tical and embodied engagement. The other is not reduced to the catego-
ries of understanding of the self, as she is encountered in the here and now, 
entailing a type of engagement that is immanent and rooted in embodi-
ment of self and other.
Ideological Constructions of Culture The recognition of the interdepen-
dence of self and other in constructing an intercultural space requires that 
the notion of culture is carefully deconstructed. In particular, the dichot-
omy between Western and non-Western perspectives, and the attribution 
of culture as a characteristic of the other. This phenomenon, whereby indi-
viduals are deemed to be determined by their own culture, is defined with 
the term culturalism by Eriksen and Stjernfelt (2012). Culturalism has 
become a political ideology in both right wing politics and left wing mul-
ticulturalism (Eriksen and Stjernfelt 2009), meaning that culture is mobil-
ised to reinforce nationalist politics through the ideological use of the 
notion of defence of national values against alien cultures. At the same 
time, culture is employed to force people into cultural identities in the 
name of pluralism, tolerance and the multicultural idea of the coexistence 
of separate cultures. Gillespie, Howarth and Cornish (2012, p. 393) argue 
that social categories such as culture, which are employed to categorise 
individuals, are not fixed and stable entities but they are perspectival, 
reflecting ‘the pluralism of the social world’ and the impossibility to estab-
lish scientifically ‘true’ social categories. From this perspective, by empha-
sising the inter, or the processual and immanent aspect of the intercultural, 
individuals negotiate their own positioning during communicative 
exchanges instead of enacting a fixed, static cultural identity. This aspect, 
however, brings to light another dimension, that of power imbalance 
between interactants in communication.
Power Imbalance Between Interactants This dimension is dependent on 
sociolinguistic competence in the use of the language of interaction, for 
example in situations where the exchange happens between native and non-
native speakers, or between speakers using a lingua franca (Byram and 
Zarate 1997). Moreover, the choice that determines the language of inter-
action reflects positions of hegemony and perceived superiority of one dom-
inant language, for example international English, over other languages 
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(Hymes 1996; Louhiala-Salminen et al. 2005; Byram 2008; Jack 2009). 
This power imbalance in communication is described by Hymes (1996) as 
a dynamic through which language becomes an instrument that recreates 
structural inequality.
context
The context of interaction is determined by the ways in which interlocu-
tors are positioned: the language being used, their competence in the lan-
guage of interaction, and the relationships between interlocutors taking 
part in the communicative exchange. In other words, the setting of a com-
municative event is not only influenced by language, but also by the ways 
in which the participants are positioned in relation to other factors such as 
gender, class, social status and other social categories independently of lan-
guage use (Regan et al. 2009). Among these categories culture is crucial, 
particularly the phenomenon of culturalism, meaning the ways in which 
interlocutors are assigned a cultural identity or choose to act a cultural 
identity. Holliday (2011) defines culture as a discursive production which 
expresses how individuals socially construct an image of the cultural 
resources available to them and, consequently, ‘they may play up and exag-
gerate various aspects of cultural resources available to them’ (p. 144). Thus, 
it is important to define context not as static but as emergent, dynamic and 
negotiated by the participants in the interaction (Regan et al. 2009). For 
all the above reasons, an appreciation of context in intercultural communi-
cative exchanges is a crucial element in the acquisition of dialogic intercul-
tural competence. Moreover, the influence of language in the context of 
interaction is an aspect that has been often overlooked in intercultural 
communication (Dervin and Liddicoat 2013) and consequently in models 
of intercultural competence. Although the politics of language teaching 
and the Savoirs as sociocultural competence (Byram and Zarate 1997; 
Byram and Risager 1999), the idea of languaging (Phipps and Gonzalez 
2004), and the notion of the multilingual subject (Kramsch 2009) address 
the issue of intercultural language teaching and learning, culture remains 
prominent in analysing phenomena related to understanding and interac-
tion between members from different countries. This issue has been 
addressed first by Scollon and Scollon (1995), and subsequently Blommaert 
(1998) and Piller (2011), who have focused on the impact of sociolinguis-
tic competence in the language of interaction as the principal cause of 
misunderstanding and miscommunication in intercultural communication. 




which is negotiated by all participants, the ‘messiness’ of actual interactions 
(Phipps 2007) demonstrates the limitations of attempts to understand and 
regulate communication using the category of culture. This means that 
establishing dialogical relations lived in the immanent here and now 
requires an understanding of the complexity of factors that constitute the 
context of interaction,
Paying close attention to actual interactions not only reminds us of the 
importance of natural language and the complexity of human interactions; 
it also demonstrates that interactants sometimes simply do not want to 
understand each other and that misunderstandings arise not only because of 
linguistic or cultural differences, but also because people fight and argue. 
Put differently, in interactions there are often simply different interests at 
stake and interactants may not actually want to understand each other. 
Intercultural communication research often creates the impression that if we 
just knew how to overcome our linguistic and cultural differences, we would 
get on just fine with each other and the world would be transformed into a 
paradise on earth. (Piller 2011, p. 155)
In this sense, an intercultural speaker adopting a dialogic approach is able 
not only to analyse the constraints that influence interaction and the role of 
language in the communicative exchange, but is also able to recognise and 
understand the ways in which culture is being enacted and recreated. From 
this perspective, concerns relating to the use of the category of culture to 
explain when something ‘goes wrong’ in communication are addressed by 
the straightforward relation with the other described by Levinas, which 
relates to his notion of responsibility intended as a response to the other 
that occurs through engagement in dialogue. This notion of responsibility 
is described by Bakhtin (1986) as the addressivity of language, the fact that 
all interactants are active participants in communication.
the multIPersPectIval
Guilherme defines competence as the acquisition of a critical awareness of 
context. This awareness is achieved through the acquisition of specific 
skills, attitudes and knowledge,
It entails becoming aware of the web of intra- and intercultural meanings 
that are always struggling and evolving. The more conscious we are of the 
constraints, implications, and possibilities that each situation carries, the 
more critical we become. (Guilherme 2002, p. 155)
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With regard to this model of critical cultural awareness, the final aim of the 
development of critical intercultural competence is the achievement of 
symmetry between self and other. This means that, the analysis of cultural 
differences facilitates the understanding of how these differences influence 
communication and fosters the ability to assess ‘the constraints, implica-
tions and possibilities’ (ibid.) guiding communicative exchanges. According 
to this model of critical cultural awareness, this type of intercultural under-
standing establishes a form of reciprocity between the self and the other. 
This ideal of critical awareness responds to a conception of the self mod-
elled on Kantian autonomous rational subjectivity. In contrast to this con-
ception of the relation between self and other, the notion of asymmetry 
underlying the idea of an heteronomous self takes into account the fact 
that in the inter- of communication, in the messiness of languaging (Phipps 
and Gonzalez 2004; Phipps 2007), self and other can never achieve trans-
parent communication, perfect correspondence and symmetry. However, 
the acceptance of the impossibility to reach this ideal of ‘a paradise on 
earth’ (Piller 2011, p. 155), meaning the idea of a promise of  understanding 
in which all conflicting claims are pacified in the name of a higher universal 
truth, brings about another dimension of communication between self 
and other. Accounts of critical awareness (see Tomic and Lengel 1997; 
Tomic 2001; Guilherme 2002) describe the process in which the encoun-
ter with the strangeness of another cultural perspective allows the self to 
reflect critically on his/her own cultural standpoint and to discover the 
other within oneself. From this perspective, through critical reflection the 
self understands the behaviour of the other as the expression of cultural 
difference. Consequently, the self is able to negotiate these differences, 
and can finally assess critically his/her own cultural tradition in the light of 
this encounter with the other. Although this is a desirable outcome of 
interaction in intercultural encounters, another aspect of communication 
between self and other can be interpreted within a dialogical perspective. 
Returning to the aforementioned notion of immigrancy of the self (Cavell 
1996), the fact that the self is defined through the act of negotiating and 
translating meanings, it can be argued that through open- ended dialogue 
intended as saying, self and other do not simply accept their reciprocal 
belonging to different cultural traditions. Instead of directing interaction 
toward an ideal of tolerance, open ended dialogue enables the discovery 
that both self and other are incomplete beings. This means that the other 
is not simply a mirror reflecting the otherness present within the self, 




incompleteness expressed in the inadequacy of culture to explain the 
behaviour of the other interlocutor.
a comParIson of comPetence models
The positions of self and other in interaction and the respective underlying 
assumptions of each framework are illustrated in Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
Dialogic interaction is illustrated in Fig. 4.1.
Table 4.2 illustrates intercultural competence understood as the ability 
to deal effectively with the other. Knowledge about the culture of the 
other, and the skills to communicate effectively are acquired before the 
interaction.
Underlying assumptions: effectiveness, communicative transparency, 
tolerance, awareness of culture, rationality, autonomy, cultural sensitivity.
Table 4.3 illustrates intercultural competence as the ability to develop 
critical awareness of culture in order to communicate effectively. As a result 
of intercultural interaction, the self is transformed into an  intercultural 
being who can communicate effectively with the other and is able to assess 
cultures critically, showing high degrees of tolerance of the other.
Underlying assumptions: effectiveness, critical awareness of culture, 
autonomy, rationality, tolerance, cultural sensitivity, responsibility.
Table 4.4 illustrates competence understood as the existential readiness 
to dwell in another language and culture. This ability is acquired in inter-
action. The self is transformed after experiencing the other.
Underlying assumptions: existential, experiential, open-ended dia-
logue, messiness of intercultural encounters.
Table 4.2 The pyramid model
Self Knowledge and skills Other
Table 4.3 ICOPROMO. A transformational model
Self Knowledge and skills Other Transformation/intercultural personhood
Table 4.4 Dwelling
Self and other Experience Other in the self
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In Fig. 4.1, dialogism unfolds in interaction. Interaction results in the 
recognition of a reciprocal and common existential state of incomplete-
ness. Intercultural encounters represent the opportunity to discover the 
otherness in the familiar, and to accept the fact that both self and other 
remain unknowable.
Underlying assumptions: culture as a discursive resource of all inter-
locutors, reciprocal incompleteness of both self and other, heteronomy, 
sensibility, ethical responsibility, dialogism.
Dialogic interaction is thus dependent on attitudes that are developed in 
the praxis of engagement with the other. First of all, a critical attitude 
towards culture is enacted through the ability to question the attribution 
of cultural traits to understand the communicative behaviour of interlocu-
tors. Instead, an appreciation of context will lead to a more nuanced form 
of interaction that is guided by the willingness to engage in dialogue. 
Finally, developing existential attitudes in interaction brings about the 
acceptance of uncertainty in dialogue and the knowledge that both self and 
other are incomplete beings. These attitudes, and their underlying assump-
tions, challenge the implicit autonomy that characterises the ways in which 
intercultural competence is conceptualised in the other models discussed. 
In this sense, dialogic interaction requires the development of intercultural 
sensibility. Moreover, it addresses the methodological nationalism implicit 
in intercultural language education (Holliday 2011; Cole and Meadows 
2013), through its focus on the use of language in context, rather than on 
cultural attributes attached to idealised speakers of a language. As argued 










self and other are not beings enclosed within their own cultural horizon 
awaiting reciprocal recognition. On the contrary, the passage from the syn-
chronicity of the said to the diachrony of the saying allows the emergence 
of the interdependence of self and other, which is manifested through 
engagement in dialogue between interlocutors who remain singular, 
unique and thus, ‘other’. The epistemology underpinning these attitudes is 
based on the notions explored in the Chap. 3 in relation to Levinasian 
 ethics and it is illustrated in Table 4.5
• Asymmetry: the asymmetrical relation between self and other 
(Levinas 1985, 1998) represents a lived experience of communica-
tion between embodied subjects.
• Heteronomy: adopting the ethical framework of Levinas, heteron-
omy stands for the phenomenal world where the self interacts with 
other selves to become an ethical being. The experience of ethics is 
thus developed in interaction, intersubjectively, and not only from 
universal maxims.
• Sensibility: being affected by others as an embodied ethical self.
• Saying: this modality of discourse is the expression of the relation-
ship established in the immanent here and now.
• Promise as deferred understanding: this aspect relates to the idea 
of dialogue as open- ended engagement with others, and accep-
tance of uncertainty. This idea of deferred understanding addresses 
concerns relating to a superficial embrace of cultural difference as 
tolerance of the practices of the cultural other, particularly the cri-
tique of depoliticised versions of multiculturalism expressed in the 
image of a domesticated good other (Badiou 2001; Žižek 2006).
Table 4.5 Epistemological framework
Attitude: criticality of constructs of culture
Outcome: ability to question the attribution of cultural traits to the other
Attitude: ability to assess the context of interaction
Outcome: engagement in dialogue resulting from a critical stance towards the notion of 
tolerance of the cultural other
Attitude: readiness to engage in dialogue
Outcome: acceptance of uncertainty. Knowledge that both self and other are incomplete 
beings
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assessIng Intercultural comPetence,  
an ImPossIble task?
The categories of reliability, validity and consistency applied to the assess-
ment of intercultural competence are in fact used to determine the achieve-
ment of an end point, meaning the transformation of the self from being 
a monocultural entity to an intercultural one. This content-based approach 
presents an idealised version of intercultural competence that is abstracted 
from the complex dynamic that occurs in intercultural encounters and that 
in the present chapter have been interpreted in terms of the Marxist cate-
gory of fetishism. Therefore, considering the processual character of inter-
cultural interaction, assessment of intercultural competence has to account 
for the situated, experiential, messy, contradictory, immanent and subjec-
tive character of intercultural learning. Due to the state of flux of the 
concepts of self and other it is a very difficult task to pinpoint a definition 
of competence and consequently to set objectives for the assessment of 
competence. In this sense, Witte writes that,
Teaching and acquiring intercultural competence cannot be product- 
orientated, as there exists no definable end-product. (2011, p. 103)
Byram (1997) divides the components of intercultural competence into 
knowledge (savoirs), skills of interpreting and relating (savoir comprendre), 
skills of discovery and interaction (savoir apprendre/faire) and values in 
the form of critical cultural awareness (savoir s’engager). However, the 
foundation of intercultural competence is in the attitudes (savoir être) of 
openness, readiness to relativise and the ability to decentre. In this con-
text, Byram addresses the issue of reliability that is attached to the notion 
of assessment in terms of accountability of educators, teaching institutions 
and providers of intercultural training, highlighting the emergence of a 
‘transmission’ view of teaching and an approach that ‘atomises knowl-
edge’ (Byram 1997, p. 104) in a series of identifiable abilities that can be 
transmitted to the learner. This simplification of competences, argues 
Byram, trivializes learning:
It is the simplification of competences to what can be ‘objectively’ tested 
which has a detrimental effect: the learning of trivial facts, the reduction of 
subtle understanding to generalisations and stereotypes, the lack of atten-





Byram emphasises complexity and thick description in order to capture the 
more elusive aspects of competence, particularly through the use of port-
folios developed over a period of time. The production of portfolios con-
taining autobiographical material represents a form of self-assessment that 
helps educators and intercultural trainers in determining the achievement 
of aspects of competence. However, personal accounts and experiences are 
always complex and multidimensional, and thus difficult to assess follow-
ing criteria of reliability, validity and consistency. To this, it is possible to 
add the issue of veridicality of autobiographical material, considering the 
power relation between teachers and students, and between intercultural 
providers and individuals attending courses as required by their employ-
ees. Furthermore, Dervin (2010) adds the desire to please the teacher 
offering ready-made answers. Sercu highlights the situation when learners 
fail to achieve assessment outcomes such as the development of desired 
personality traits, for example interest in other cultures, or building posi-
tive images of self and other. To illustrate this point, Sercu brings as an 
example the Savoirs developed by Byram, asking whether the failure to 
develop determined competences and skills that are deemed to represent 
the effective intercultural person signals the inability to become intercul-
tural or simply the impossibility to decide the outcomes of intercultural 
learning prior to the intercultural experience,
If learners cannot solve a particular intercultural problem, is it because they are 
not skillful with respect to the savoir-apprendre or savoir-comprendre dimen-
sions of intercultural competence, or are inadequate savoirs the reason for 
their failure to complete an assessment task adequately? (Sercu 2004, p. 78)
Sercu here addresses a crucial aspect of intercultural assessment, asking if 
categories, level descriptors and Savoirs can encompass the complexity of 
engagement in communication and human understanding. From this per-
spective, Le Goff describes the practice of assessment in terms of a ‘gentle 
barbarism’ that characterizes modernity, whereby the creation of 
 mechanisms to evaluate skills and performance is presented as guided by 
criteria of scientificity, in the name of functional imperatives presented as 
“neutral, objective tools used by experts” (2002, p. 42). This gentle barba-
rism reduces people to a
collection of skills and to machinery seen as a more or less well-adapted to 
‘natural’ developments in which they themselves are simply elements among 
many. (Le Goff 2002, p. 44)
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This critique of modernization as a form of soft barbarism echoes the cri-
tique of instrumental reason in Adorno and Horkheimer (2010), posing 
pressing questions on the wider implications for education of the demands 
for effective and reliable assessment tools to evaluate performance, par-
ticularly when the task of assessment risks to simplify the complex dynam-
ics of intercultural learning. In line with a model of intercultural 
competence modelled on dialogism, the definition of assessment has to 
reflect the shift from a notion of the autonomous self to a conception of 
the heteronomous self. In other words, practitioners attempting to define 
the assessment of dialogic competence will have to accept that becoming 
intercultural is a process of discovery, an existential readiness to take risks 
and engage with the unknown, although not in terms of a state of com-
pleteness that is achieved at the end of intercultural learning.
conclusIon
Taking the notion of competence as paradigmatic of the epistemological 
underpinnings of intercultural communication, this chapter contrasts two 
modalities of engagement between self and other, the first in terms of an 
ideal of final reconciliation and universal tolerance, the other as deferred 
understanding and open ended dialogue. In the first instance, an etiolated 
notion of otherness emerges according to which the other is enclosed 
within the parameters of cultural categorisation. In contrast to that, dialo-
gism emphasises the partial and immanent character of communication in 
intercultural contexts. Taking this stance, however, places the intercultural 
researcher in the position of renouncing tidy classifications of skills, aims 
and objectives that can be measured reliably and consistently, in favour of 
a wider exploration of the epistemology that underpins the notion of 
assessment in education. This means that the intercultural researcher pur-
suing a model of dialogic interculturalism has to delve into the messiness 
of the intercultural and explore different theoretical approaches that offer 
new epistemological and methodological frameworks.
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Abstract This chapter summarises the themes presented in the book by 
outlining one of the principal challenges in the formulation of new meth-
odological approaches to research in intercultural communication: 
accounting for alterity in terms of letting the otherness of the other emerge 
in interaction, while considering power differentials between self and 
other. The chapter considers future challenges for intercultural communi-
cation through a shift in research that emphasises contingency and precar-
ity, or sojourning, over neat classifications and narratives of emancipation 
and final reconciliation.
Keywords Alterity • Tolerance • Intercultural subjectivity • Intercultural 
education
Final ThoughTs
The preceding chapters are characterised by a problematizing approach, 
aiming to highlight the inherent contradictions of intercultural communi-
cation research and to unravel some of its conceptual knots, particularly 
those related to the relation between self and other based on tolerance. 
Due to the historicity of the object of critique (Adorno 1973), problema-
tizing practice entails that understanding can never be totalised, rather the 
process of critique unearths further questions and raises new challenges. 
Furthermore, this approach recognises the inescapable metaphysics of 
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presence (Derrida 1997) implied in the inevitable ‘sin’ of essentialism 
committed when employing cultural categories to engage with others in 
daily interactions. In this regard, this book suggests that the exercise of 
ethical vigilance recognises this metaphysical complicity by interrogating 
the practice of cultural categorisation of the other through the idea of 
tolerance. In Chap. 3 tolerance is discussed adopting the notion of condi-
tional hospitality, or hostipitality, to use Derrida’s (2006) terminology, 
which indicates a modality of welcoming of the other that is dependent on 
the goodwill of the host. In this respect, tolerance is a discourse stemming 
from the autonomous individual of Kantian ethics, which this book con-
trasts with the values of reciprocity and inter-dependence underpinning 
dialogic intercultural interaction. This contrast between two conceptions 
of ethical engagement between self and other has represented the primary 
focus in discussing the epistemological assumptions of intercultural com-
munication in this book. Beginning with the epistemological presupposi-
tions of intercultural competence in the ideal of transparent communication 
across cultural barriers, and of the transformative power of intercultural 
consciousness in engendering tolerance and responsibility toward the cul-
tural other, the theoretical presuppositions of intercultural communica-
tion as a field of study have been critically evaluated and problematized. As 
an alternative repositioning of alterity (i.e. the distinction between self and 
not-self), intercultural communication is here envisaged in terms of 
embodiment and immanence of the other, and of deferred understanding. 
Dialogism is defined according to the modality of the saying, which is 
contrasted to attempts to totalise meaning from the perspective of compe-
tence, which this book frames adopting the modality of discourse of the 
said (Levinas 1998). This distinction between the saying and the said 
established in Chap. 3 poses the following challenge for future directions 
in intercultural communication: can a theory of intercultural communica-
tion be devised which takes account of difference and otherness as consti-
tutive of communication, while also blurring the distinction between 
inter-and intra-cultural communication? This last chapter will attempt to 
delineate an answer by pulling together the different strands in the book.
This book aims to describe the features of dialogic interaction in con-
trast to current models of intercultural competence. The critique of two 
competence models that are paradigmatic of the idea of competence cri-
tiqued in this book, the Pyramid model and the ICOPROMO project in 
Chap. 4, has highlighted the power dimension at work in communication 




and constrains the individual (Warren 2008), in contrast to a dialogic per-
spective that reconceptualises difference as a constitutive trait of the self in 
terms of incompleteness. This incompleteness, is seen emerging in the 
contrast between the state of immigrancy of the self (Cavell 1996) and the 
idea of dwelling (Heidegger 1971), and becoming more visible in the 
existential experience of intercultural interaction. This critical engagement 
with the field of intercultural communication in the preceding chapters 
hopes to contribute to a methodological shift toward a more prominent 
role of the voice of the other in research that emphasises a conceptualisa-
tion of the self in terms of embodied subjectivity rather than in terms of 
autonomy and individuality. One aspect that proves especially challenging 
is attempting to reconcile the idea of the otherness of the other while 
maintaining the character of reciprocity in interaction between self and 
other, an issue which this book frames in the context of dialogism. 
Levinas’s (1998) distinction between the saying and the said is crucial in 
this book’s attempt to theorise this reconciliation. Rather than focusing 
on the idea that is most associated with Levinasian ethics, namely the face 
of the other, this book instead emphasises the intersubjective connotations 
that emerge in the dynamic relation between the two modes of discourse 
of the saying and the said. In that dynamic relation can be identified a key 
for a conceptual description of interculturality in terms of reciprocal 
engagement that avoids essentialist generalizations while preserving alter-
ity, i.e. the separation of self and other, or asymmetry. The ethical tension 
experienced by the author when writing this book can be described as the 
endeavour to reconcile the idea of the radical otherness of the other as it 
is expressed by Levinas, with the intersubjective dimension of communica-
tion that underpins dialogism. As Levinas writes,
The relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship 
of communion, or a sympathy through which we put ourselves in the other’s 
place, we recognise the other as resembling us, but exterior to us. (Levinas 
1987, p. 75)
In that respect, this reconciliation challenges the idea of autonomy of 
the self in favour of a reappraisal of the role of the other in intercultural 
engagement. This relation of alterity proposed in this book reflects 
Levinas’s preoccupation with temporality, an aspect that is illustrated in 
reference to the saying and the said. Temporality in this context is divided 




 diachrony, i.e. the event. As belonging to a diachronic dimension of tem-
porality, the other represents the future, the unpredictable nature of the 
event, and the unfolding of communication in interaction. Here, the 
notion of deferred understanding substitutes the idea of completeness and 
final harmony that characterises the formulation of intercultural compe-
tence. An important consequence of adopting dialogism as a framework to 
understand intercultural interaction is that the possibility of conflict and 
misunderstanding are not glossed over, because they are recognised as 
constitutive of communication. This aspect of the relation with the other 
was recognised by Levinas, who wrote: “The Other is the sole being I can 
wish to kill” (Levinas 1969, p. 198).
Interaction is not idealised in a model of communicative transparency, 
however the emphasis on the ethical aspect of dialogism is underpinned by 
acceptance of uncertainty, and therefore the possibility of conflict and mis-
understanding, and the fact that the other remains exterior to us. Giving 
account of this exteriority of the other, which for Levinas means the radi-
cal otherness of the other, represents one of the ethical and methodologi-
cal challenges facing the theory of intercultural communication. The 
critical frameworks described in Chap. 2, namely perspectivism, liquid 
interculturality, the critical cosmopolitan potential and critical intercul-
tural citizenship, focus on the hybrid and changing nature of the self, 
while reasserting the power of critical thinking to demystify false and dis-
torted representations of the other. This book adds another perspective to 
critical intercultural thinking, according to which the self initiates an inter-
cultural journey only after encountering the other, in line with the 
Levinasian description of the ethical as stemming from outside the self in 
Chap. 3. Given the loss of autonomy of the self that this conception of the 
ethical entails, intercultural experiences cannot be predicted in advance 
through the imposition of outcomes and the definition of competences. 
Rather, the intercultural is best described in terms of an existential disposi-
tion characterised by embodiment and incompleteness. In this sense, the 
idea that “the Other is the sole being I can wish to kill” (Levinas 1969, 
p. 198), describes the conundrum that characterises the theoretical frame-
work that informs this book: if the self does not renounce the solipsistic 
practice of categorisation of the other, the experience of intercultural 
encounters remains devoid of ethical significance. However, encounter 
does not equate to harmony and reconciliation, because the other remains 
exterior to the self, meaning that the ethical here is intended as unfolding 




independence of the other in respect to the self represents the ultimate 
form of annihilation: “To kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to 
renounce comprehension absolutely” (ibid.). Thus, essentialist practices of 
othering preclude any possibility of engagement and comprehension by 
creating a framework that is superimposed on the other.
FuTure DirecTions anD MeThoDological iMplicaTions
In the exploration of the ethical conditions of intercultural engagement, 
this book raises the question of methodological approaches that include 
attentiveness to the other in shaping a post-methodology based on the 
decentring of the researcher. In this sense, it is necessary to maintain an 
interdisciplinary effort that enables different perspectives to emerge in 
research and this final chapter suggests three future directions for the 
development of a post-methodological framework in intercultural com-
munication. One of the principal challenges facing researchers is to con-
front established methodological approaches based on paradigms 
developed in the social sciences. According to Phipps (2013), this fact 
creates a rift between theoretical explorations of ethical issues and the 
necessities of academic methodological requirements. Crucially, Phipps 
argues that exploratory, post-colonial and decentring methods have not 
been sufficiently incorporated in social scientific methodologies, particu-
larly in the fields of applied linguistics and intercultural education. 
According to Phipps, theorising a ‘post-methodology’ that encompasses 
the decentring of the researcher represents a crucial issue in intercultural 
studies, meaning that both researcher and researched are able to
continuously negotiate the meanings and dynamics and the potential for 
aesthetic resonance of their speech such that the speech and speakerhoods 
may debate, dialogue, translate, interpret and chorus their understandings 
and hopes for their particular intercultural world. (Phipps 2013, p. 18)
Thus, it has to be established how this open ended dialogue between 
researcher and researched can be developed within a framework that is 
acceptable in academic contexts, to assure that
research methods in language and intercultural communication can rise to 
the considerable challenge of ‘ceasing their zealous defining and fixing of 





The decentring stance of the researcher translates in the acceptance of 
uncertainty, which entails entering in responsible engagement with others 
in dialogue. Following from this initial presupposition, the first direction 
for the development of a post-methodological framework is to adopt 
Todd’s (2003) invitation to approach research as the practice of listening. 
According to Corradi (1990), our use of language is characterised not 
only by expression, but also by our ability to listen. The type of listening 
that envisioned in intercultural research is that of enabling the other to 
speak through decentring of the self, meaning that “the listener provides 
opportunities for further speech, for further elaboration to occur, where what 
matters is not the listener per se, but the speaker being able to speak” (Todd 
2003, p. 406). In other words, the practice of listening can be translated 
as the endeavour to let the saying emerge in communication, as discussed 
in Chap. 3 in relation to the contribution of Levinas in intercultural com-
munication. Although Levinas’s ethical framework is underpinned by the 
corporeity of interaction and the bodily presence of self and other, engage-
ment with the other can be established at a distance via images, events and 
narratives that elicit an ethical call and invite a response. Indeed, Butler’s 
call (2012) relating to the importance of extending the preoccupation 
with the closeness of the individual other to account for the mediated 
character of contemporaneity, means that the ethical call may arise from an 
‘elsewhere’ rather than the ‘here and now’. This is demonstrated in the 
pervasiveness of media in contemporary life which poses the challenge of 
responding to the other “at a distance” (p. 134). In this context, the pre-
occupation with embodied subjectivity that characterises Levinasian ethics 
can be applied to ethical engagement with the other from a distance, 
through the critique of the essentialism that pervades representations of 
the other in the media and in political discourse.
The second direction, in line with the more critical perspectives in 
intercultural communication, suggests a turn in research increasingly con-
cerned with the sense of precarity and insecurity that permeates the cur-
rent political climate, characterised by political discourses that pursue a 
neo-liberal agenda in which uniformity and sameness become totalising 
narratives that marginalise the other as undesirable. In this respect, the 
analysis of the ways in which the other is framed, silenced and marginalised 
represents a challenge for intercultural communication, because firstly it 
problematizes the role of researchers engaged in intercultural research, 





The third direction, and connected to the above two points, relates to 
attention to alterity in terms of letting the otherness of the other emerge 
in interaction, while considering power differentials between self and 
other. This remains one the principal challenges in the definition of the 
pedagogical principles of interculturality. As discussed in Chap. 4, dialo-
gism offers an alternative to the emphasis placed on culture in foreign 
language education. Moreover, dialogism addresses the issue of a powerful 
legislating self related to the idea of emancipation in critical intercultural 
awareness in delineated in Chap. 2. As argued in that chapter, emancipa-
tion rests on the centrality of the self in relation to the world which, in 
accordance to a Levinasian ethical framework, constitutes a form of totali-
sation. In this regard, the question of translating intersubjectivity into an 
educational project remains an endeavour that warrants further explora-
tion. This project could assume as starting points singularity and asym-
metry between self and other in order to redefine interculturality as a 
process of sojourning and translation of the self. The temporal tension 
between the present state of solipsism of the self and the future glimpsed 
through the encounter with otherness underpins the book, and to con-
clude in Levinas’s words:
The other is the future. The very relationship with the other is the relation-
ship with the future. (Levinas 1987, p. 77)
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